Host: For the last month, delegates from all across Afghanistan met under a big tent in Kabul to hammer out a new constitution. The democratic charter was overwhelmingly approved. The five hundred and two members of the loya jirga or grand council had worked through weeks of disagreement and intense debate to arrive at a consensus. Some of the hardest-fought issues involved women’s rights, whether to recognize as official the languages spoken by ethnic minorities and the role of religion. After the delegates stood to endorse the new constitution, Afghan president Hamid Karzai declared, “There is no winner or loser, this is the success of the whole Afghan nation.” President George W. Bush applauded the delegates saying, “A democratic Afghanistan will serve the interests and just aspirations of all the Afghan people and help ensure that terror finds no further refuge in that proud land.” What are the prospects for a democratic Afghanistan? I’ll ask my guests: Ishaq Shahryar, until recently the Afghan ambassador to the U.S.; David Isby, defense analyst and author of the book “War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan Invasion and Resistance,” and Elie Krakowski, senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. Welcome and thanks for joining us today.

Ambassador Ishaq Shahryar, before we get to the particulars of what’s in the constitution, let’s talk a little bit about how the agreement was arrived at. Does the way that the constitution was worked out bode well or bode ill for democratic prospects in Afghanistan?

Shahryar: Well, first of all, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Afghan people and also most importantly the delegates, the five hundred men and women that they got together, that worked together for twenty-two days and debated the subject most democratically and openly. It’s quite commendable. And also, I would like to congratulate President Karzai for his leadership, to manage to put such a thing together; and most of all, my gratitude to President Bush and his administration for planting the seed of democracy in Afghanistan. So it has been a historic day, a historic moment for Afghanistan. I don’t think this ever happened in the history of Afghanistan, or to my knowledge to any other Islamic country in the region like this.

Host: David Isby, was the result a surprise?

Isby: Certainly I don’t think so. It was set out, the process did have a lot of momentum going in. But there were ways it could have stopped. There could have been walk outs. Some of these so-called “warlords” could have said “I have non-negotiable demands and me and my followers are going to step outside the big tent and have our own constitutional convention.” So the fact that despite the divisions of the Afghan population and in Afghan politics which have now reemerged, they still have a great sense of themselves as Afghans, as one nation. This is not the former Yugoslavia. Everyone in the country, despite their ethnic differences still wants to be an Afghan. Host: Elie Krakowski, even up toward the end of this process there was almost a vote taken when a number of people had left the tent and yet at the end of the day, they were able to achieve a consensus. Are you surprised that they were able to achieve a consensus as opposed to merely voting and getting a majority for a constitution that might not have had broad support?

Krakowski: I’m not really surprised, though I think that when one followed the goings on at the loya jirga every day was a surprise. At the same time I think that as Ambassador Shahryar indicated, I think that this is an unbelievable event. I think it illustrates a number of things, one is the real individualistic act of Afghans. They all have opinions and sometimes if you have two Afghans you have three opinions. And I think that’s a very nice thing. And it’s also an admirable thing to see that here is a country which is not yet fully at peace, where the United States staged a major military intervention where the United States was a key power, and you see people from a number of different groupings, some with very, very opposite views still hammering it out and after twenty-two days as David said, there were options of people walking out of doing all sorts of things and there were times where people were a little afraid that might happen. In the end, I think the Afghans understood that this was in fact a unique opportunity and they took advantage of it and I think it bodes very well for the future.

Host: David Isby.

Isby: I think this very much was a return in some ways to traditional Afghan negotiations, give a little, get a little. In the past people have been encouraged to take maximalist positions by foreign patrons, by those who had an interest in continuing the conflict. And indeed until recently Afghans really didn’t know what is possible in terms of politics.

Krakowski: And I think, if I may, because that’s an important point: Outside states had tried to interfere and did and tried to influence what was going on and in the end I think the Afghans were able to speak for themselves with all these deep divisions, as David said -- give and take and arrive at a consensus. I think that is something that not only should be praised, it should be admired. And I noticed that the whining press, which tends to always see negatives has at least temporarily paused in its negativist approach, because I think it’s difficult not to recognize.

Host: Ambassador Shahryar.

Shahryar: Finally what is touching and very pleasing is that was proved at this loya jirga was that we are no longer Northern Alliance, or Southern Alliance or Uzbeks or Pashtuns, we’re all Afghans. And that has proved the point and I think it’s tremendous, steps forward to go to a reconstruction of Afghanistan and it brings stability to the country.

Host: This was one of the key points that was fought over in the guise of language and how language would be spoken, whether Uzbek would be an official language of the country or not. And I guess at the end of the day the agreement was there would be two official languages and then in regions where a majority spoke a different language, it would be recognized there. It would seem that though the agreement allows everybody to say we are all Afghans, at the same time you persist in having regional languages over the long haul, does that leave room for again, regional identities trumping the national identity?

Shahryar: By the end of the day they came to the conclusion that the official languages have always been Dari and Pashtun and yet, the language that is spoken the most in the other regions, they are official in that region. So, I think it’s a tremendous compromise. It’s also because the language is spoken in some parts of the country, why not make it official for that part?

Host: David Isby, is the language the crux of these sort of regional differences or is the language merely a sort of stalking horse if you will for issues that have to do with regional power.

Isby: Well the answer is both. Language is a key thing, however ethno-linguistic divisions, we in the West like to have our colored maps which show a very definitive reality which is not seen on the ground in Afghanistan. And in many ways the corporate language and ethnic divisions, also religious divisions, divisions in outlook and also economic divisions. Afghanistan, so far, it’s national economy was destroyed by war. You so far have weaker regional economies, which lead to fragmentation on local, regional, often ethno-linguistic lines. So it is important, but we in the west tend to see it much too much as the whole story and it’s only part of it.

Krakowski: I think so as well. I think what one has to remember is the following: and that is that there are some real insecurities on the part of a number of groups in Afghanistan in terms of being discriminated against or the power of another ethnic group being imposed. And I think that the issue of language in part is a reflection of these lingering insecurities which, hopefully, will be soon laid to rest through the process of this loya jirga and the constitution. At the same time, I think it’s also important to keep in mind that in Afghanistan when you talk to Afghans and when you know Afghans, there are an enormous number of people whose father is, let’s say, a Pashtun and who’s mother is a Tajik or vice-versa, Uzbek, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to talk about Uzbeks or Tajiks as such. That doesn’t mean they don’t exist. But it means there are a lot of Afghans who see themselves as far more than simply one ethnic group. And encouraging and constantly talking about ethnic groups and ethnic divisions and ethnic rights, I think ultimately is bound to be counter-productive. I think what is being done and should be done even more, is to emphasize the importance of the individual and the protection of the individual, because if you protect the group, you don’t protect the individual necessarily. If you protect the individual, you automatically protect the group. And I think that in encouraging the development of Afghanistan, that is the kind of thing we should do.

Host: Ambassador Shahryar, what were some of the other stumbling blocks that the delegates had to work their way through to achieve a consensus?

Shahryar: Well, I think the other division was the subject of dual citizenship. When I became ambassador, I’d been living in this country for forty-seven years. By U-S law, I had to give up my U-S citizenship. So the delegates were arguing that ministers in the cabinet also, and other officials who hold key positions in the government should also give up their other citizenship and become Afghans. I think that also is a concern to me because the problem is that Afghanistan has been in war for twenty-two years, so one of the things that lacked and suffered the most was education. So the young generation that was born and grew during this period, a majority lacks their education. So in order for Afghanistan, for the development of the country, for reconstruction, one of the human resources that they can rely on is the Afghan diaspora, whether it’s Afghan-Americans or Afghan-Europeans or Australians. Afghans have been all over the world lately and most of them have become very educated. So this Afghan diaspora is the one that we count on to go and build a country. And this solution was cleverly was managed also. I think that was, as you said, the Afghan way of doing that, was they came to a compromise where they’ll let the Parliament decide that. And so the Parliament will be selected six months after the President is selected and then after that all the ministers should have Afghan citizenship, but if there are ones that have dual citizenship, the Parliament has to approve that. So, I think that compromise is valuable.

Host: David Isby, what about the issue of women’s rights? How much was that an issue during the loya jirga?

Isby: Certainly it was an issue and like many others it became a stalking horse for other issues on the role of traditional Afghan beliefs, Islam and also foreign influence. The people who opposed the foreign influence, which they see as a foreign emphasis on human rights, could use the women’s issue to rally nationalist support: “They are telling us how we must treat our women, our female citizens.” And the fact that that didn’t take place, that in fact the women’s issue was resolved with more rather than less rights being given to women showed that indeed this was an issue which was not used successfully to block this.

Host: So, am I correct that in the constitution now, in the lower chamber there will be two houses of congress, if you will, two legislative bodies and in the lower one there’s twenty-five percent set aside for women?

Isby: Well, there will be two representatives per province. And the draft said there would be one woman representative per province. So we are guaranteed that at least, of Afghanistan’s thirty-two provinces two women for each, plus more who may be elected.

Host: Elie Krakowski, David Isby brings up the issue of the role of Islam in the constitution for Afghanistan. How was that issue resolved? What sort of decision was made on the role that Islam would have in the Afghan government?

Krakowksi: Well, again, I think it was, as with other issues, through a certain amount of compromise between those people who insisted that it should be the only thing and the dominant thing and those people who wanted to have it there but much more in the background. And so ultimately, the more fundamentalist elements have had some success in getting some provisions in there. And Islam is a significant component. Personally I am not sure. It probably would have been better to be a little closer to the Turkish model, from my standpoint, because there are possible issues. But in general, I think it was a very reasonable compromise.

Host: Ambassador Shahryar, is the compromise on the role of Islam one that will be able to hold in Afghanistan?

Shahryar: Yes. You know have to realize that Afghanistan has always been an Islamic country. And also Islam is not contradictory to democracy and human rights and all that. So, therefore, to have the rule of Islam, a moderate Islam in Afghanistan is consistent with our past. And so, therefore, the compromise was very well taken.

Isby: I think very much its like the 1964 constitution in which even though there was a legal code, Sharia was seen as the backup. If [there’s] anything the law leaves open, look to the Sharia. This way also, however, removes potential conflict between the majority Hanafi Sunni practice of Sharia and that of Jafari Sharia which the Shia community looks to. And that was an issue under the 1964 constitution that the Shias believed their religious practices were not being taken into account and not fully represented. Here we see a compromise. We hopefully diffuse tendencies towards tension between Sunni and Shia minority.

Host: Ambassador Shahryar, there’s been a lot of talk about the extent to which the Taleban has tried to reassert itself, particularly in the Southern provinces. Does having a compromise on the role of Islam help in diffusing any appeal that the Taleban might have?

Shahryar: Well, as I said the moderate Taleban are a part Afghanistan that respects the moderate Islam. The leadership of the Taleban which [consisted of] extremists, which I don’t even call it Islam, it was a hijacking Islam for their own personal gains and personal advantages. So, I will say that using the word of Islam is not only pleasing to moderate Taleban but to all Afghans. And I must also address the problem of Shia and Sunni. There’s been very little problem in Afghanistan. I think the problem of Shia and Sunni has been more exaggerated in foreign press than domestically. The differences between the Shia and the Sunnis are in Afghanistan. And in Islam, it’s really not a drastic change. It’s one God Allah and Mohammed the prophet and the Koran is Holy Book. And the difference is that the Shia claim that after Mohammed, Ali, his cousin and son in law, should have been in power as Khaleef, where the Sunnis took the democratic way, electing an elderly man like Abu Bakr and Ali became the third Khaleef. So, it’s a very minor political difference rather than a major religious difference between the Shia and the Sunni. So therefore, I have never experienced in Afghanistan a tremendous difficulty or problem between the Shia and Sunni. So it has been a welcome thing for all the Shia and for all Muslims in the country. Host: Elie Krakowski, let me ask you, in terms of challenges that Afghanistan faces now, we’ve talked a little bit about any resurgence of the extreme Taleban leadership. Do you think that’s likely to happen and if so, is it being encouraged by any of the countries in the region? Pakistan used to be supporters of the Taleban or anybody else in the region?

Krakowski: Well, yes, I think the various outside states, including Russia and Iran and Pakistan and some others as well, all are interfering in one way or another. The Pakistanis now find themselves so to speak without the major kind of influence that they had before and they have, that is to say, elements within the military intelligence, the I-S-I, certainly the extremist political parties in Pakistan have been very actively encouraging and supporting the Taleban and Al-Qaida and disrupted operations in Afghanistan. They, that is the Pakistanis -- I was there in September -- and I was astonished at the openness with which some of them are quite favorable to the Taleban, saying, “What’s wrong with them?” I think part of the motivation for the Pakistani activity is they, like some others are still not sure that the United States will remain for the long-term in Afghanistan. And they believe that they have to try to ensure their interests. I think they are very short-sighted even in that. And in doing that, therefore, in backing those people who they think and serve their own interests.

Host: I’m afraid we’re almost out of time. David Isby with about thirty seconds left, what’s next for Afghanistan in terms of elections and the next step?

Isby: Elections first for the presidency, and then for a parliament, first the schedule for June and before that there will have to be extensive voter registration efforts. But they have the big momentum coming out of the loya jirga and in politics momentum is key. So, one can be guardedly optimistic about the situation.

Host: Ambassador Shahryar, ten seconds left.

Shahryar: I think the main thing is this constitution really doesn’t discuss the role of the presidency, a system of presidency rather than parliamentary. I think a strong president, I quite agreed with President Karzai, is very much needed to put the country together.

Host: I’m afraid that’s going to have to be the last word for today. I’d like to thank our guests: Ishaq Shahryar, former Afghan Ambassador to the U-S; David Isby, author and defense analyst; and Elie Krakowski, of the American Foreign Policy Council. Before we go, I’d like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can e-mail them to Ontheline@ibb.gov For On the Line, I’m Eric Felten.