Transcript

Host: This is On the Line and I'm Eric Felten. The Turkish parliament broke into a fistfight as lawmakers debated changes to the country's constitution that would allow the direct election of president by popular vote. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party proposed the constitutional reforms after its candidate for president was blocked in the legislature. Secularist politicians and Turkey's internally powerful military are opposed to a consolidation of power by Mr. Erdogan's party, which has its roots as a Islamic movement.

The United States is in favor of Turkey becoming more democratic, says State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey:

Casey: "We fully support Turkey's democratic institutions and leaders. We want the people of Turkey to be able to decide on their president and their other leadership. That's who needs to be in charge of decisions about who rules Turkey."

Host: At the same time, Turkey is moving troops to the border with Iraq, threatening to act against Kurdish separatists accused of mounting terrorist attacks in Turkey. And the question of Turkish entry into the European Union has come the forefront with the election of new French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who publicly opposes EU membership for Turkey. How will this political crisis over the roles of Islam and democracy in Turkey play out? I'll ask my guests: Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and John K. Glenn, Director of Foreign Policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Welcome, and thanks for joining us today.

Bulent Aliriza, how serious is the political crisis in Turkey at this point?

Aliriza: Oh, it's very serious. There was supposed to be a new president elected by May 15th to replace Ahmet Necdet Sezer. He said that it was blocked in the legislature. Actually, it wasn't. It had to go to the Constitutional Court, which decided that a certain number had to be reached in the legislature before you could elect the president. This had never been done before. And as a result, Ahmet Necdet Sezer stays in his post beyond his allotted time. We have early elections, which Recep Tayyip Erdogan once said was not going to be the case. And we also had a military demarche on the deteriorating situation, as they viewed it. So whichever way you look at it, this is a very serious situation.

Host: John Glenn, what's your sense?

Glenn: I agree very much. I think you're right about that. I think that what's happening right now has a particular urgency because of the context in which it takes place. It has an urgency because of what's happening on the border with Iraq. It has an urgency because of what's happening vis-à-vis Turkey's internal debate on secularism, on its Muslim identity, and what its future will be in the current context. And this is why the election of a president, I think, has taken on a sort of a special -- as I say, a special urgency among people, for both the United States and for Europe -- why these things really matter right now.

Host: Bulent Aliriza, what's your sense? What's the argument in Turkey over the Justice and Development Party -- the AKP, as the initials translate into English -- with regard to it being rooted as an Islamic party and yet this debate over whether it is within the secular tradition or a threat to secularism? What's that debate all about?

Aliriza: Well, clearly, it has its roots in the Islamist movement in Turkey, as you said. But from the very outset, it declared that it was not an Islamist party, no doubt mindful of the fact that Islamist parties have had a tough time in Turkey. In fact, all its predecessors were shut down. So, from the very --

Host: Shut down by...

Aliriza: By the system which is very careful about implementing the secular traditions of the Turkish Constitution. So its ancestors, as it were, were closed down because they were believed to be propagating Islam. The JDP, even though it has its roots in the Islamist movement, said from the outset that it was not an Islamist party. But nonetheless we've got to a situation four and a half years into this government where it's been objectively defined by those who have never believed that it did not have a hidden Islamist agenda, saying that it was a threat to the secular system. And in effect what we're seeing is the end of the cohabitation between a party with Islamist roots trying to maintain a working relationship with the strict secular system. And it's creaking at the edges. There are discussions over a possible coup by the military, which has intervened four times in the past. And this is the kind of thing that one did not imagine as we entered into the twenty-first century.

Host: John Glenn, what's your sense? Why this sense by the secularists in Turkey that the Justice and Development Party is somehow still a threat to the Turkish Constitution?

Glenn: I think the key phrase in what Bulent said here was their fear of a hidden agenda. Because I think if you look at the history -- sort of the record, if you will -- of governance by the AK Party, you see not an Islamist agenda. You see record of remarkable economic growth after years of Turkey being considered an economic basket case. You see Turkey meeting obligations to come closer to E.U. membership. You see Turkey making remarkable progress in a lot of spheres that were hitherto thought really impossible. Someone said recently, "What's remarkable to me about the crisis right now in Turkey is nobody's talking about economics." It's all about politics right now. And so yeah, the fear is that, despite this public record, there is a hidden agenda, an Islamist agenda. Now, I mean, some of this, I think, is symbolic. We know that Prime Minister Erdogan's wife wears a head scarf. We know the same thing to be true for the proposed candidate, Foreign Minister Gul. And I think that symbols are powerful. We know that head scarves have roiled debates in France and many places. But I think, in many ways, it's really about a debate between what people fear the intentions of this party are. I very much agree. I think that they have distanced themselves from the Islamist party, which they originated from, and their public record seems to support that.

Host: Bulent Aliriza.

Aliriza: If I could pick up on that -- The symbolism is indeed very important. When the JDP came to power in November 2002, Ahmet Necdet Sezer was president, had been for the previous two years. And throughout the four and a half years of the JDP, by blocking legislation, by rejecting appointments, he in effect took on the role of the main opposition to the JDP. And the thought of somebody from that party, with a wife wearing a head scarf, the Islamic head scarf, taking over the presidency was clearly anathema to those who feared all along that the JDP was a threat to the secular system. All the achievements under the JDP were put to one side by those who were convinced that if the JDP was to take over the presidency, then this would be the end of the secular system in Turkey, then mobilized the street demonstrations, in effect influenced the Constitutional Court in many ways, and ultimately led to the military demarche of April 27th, as a result of which we now have a crisis. And it's really unclear how this one's going to work out.

Glenn: May I?

Host: Yes.

Glenn: I think that this is really one of the most important parts about this, because this debate about secularism, it is in many ways at the heart of Turkey's modern identity. I think, from the outside, however, when we look at this period -- When Americans or Europeans look at this, they can get a little bit confused by the current debate around Islamic fundamentalism. And I think that what we miss is exactly the sort of points that were being made here -- the symbolism, that this is a debate that is very central to what Turkey means. But what we miss on the other hand is that if we look who the alternatives are. I mean, we don't see, on the other hand -- We see what would be less -- Many of these people might be considered nationalists. Many of these people might be considered folks who would be worried about globalization. We see, I think, in Turkey two groups. We talked about a working compromise between -- or a working relationship, I think you said. And I think that's exactly right. We're seeing Turkey try to have two very different groups that don't get along, that don't agree, work out their differences within the democratic framework. And I think that's what most people are hoping will happen, is that the democratic process and the Turkish political institutions will be strong enough to enable them to work out their differences.

Host: Bulent Aliriza, is it going to be strong enough to work out those differences?

Aliriza: I'm not as optimistic as some on this issue, because if the JDP was to emerge with an electoral victory similar to what it achieved in November 2002, those people who are worried about the ascendancy of the JDP, symbolized by its "capture," as they would put it, of the presidential palace, would be no doubt galvanized into action. There may even be people who might want to stop this election, if at all possible, by saying, "The JDP's gonna win anyway, so what's the point of allowing this election?" So, you know, the democratic system in Turkey, which has been interrupted, as I said, four times in the past, in its fifty-year history, is going to be tested.

Host: John Glenn, to what extent is this a struggle not between Islamic and secular powers, but rather between elected power bases and nonelected power bases over where the source of power in Turkey is going to come from?

Glenn: Well, it's a really interesting point, because I think the question of democratic legitimacy will be at the forefront of how this is resolved. But there's actually sort of an electoral technicality that has to be recognized. The AK Party won the elections fairly and freely the last time, and they have a large percentage of the population in support of them. But Turkey has an unusually high threshold for a party to join the parliament -- It's ten percent of the vote that each party must receive in order to join Parliament. That's five percent higher, or double, the rate in Germany, for example. And so I think what we've seen is the Turkish system in the last election had a far fewer number of parties than we might have expected in there. The number of -- The percentage of the general Turkish population who voted for the AK Party is actually not above fifty percent. It's a much smaller number. But given that ten-percent threshold, there were many people who are not participating in the political process right now. And so in a lot of ways, I think the question will be what the democratic opposition can do. Can they unite? Can they actually reach that ten-percent threshold? And would we then see a larger number of parties in Parliament? Would we see a different composition of a possible coalition government, if that was needed? I think that's, in many ways, the question we're gonna see, is how they deal with that electoral threshold. And it's a technical matter, but it has very large consequences for who's elected.

Host: Bulent Aliriza, how about that? We've got the Justice and Development Party having gained the ruling-party status with about a third of the vote because of these technicalities in how the parliament is formed in Turkey. How does that affect the debate about democratic legitimacy within Turkey?

Aliriza: Well, they got one-third of the votes, but they got almost two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly, precisely because of the electoral system that's been described. Now, what happened last time were the two parties got into the National Assembly -- the JDP and the Republican People's Party, the RPP. If a third and possibly a fourth party get over the ten-percent threshold and make their way into the National Assembly, it's very unlikely that the JDP will get anywhere near the numbers that they had before. You know, we can talk about the permutations, but frankly it's too early to do so.

Host: Sure.

Aliriza: But given the fact that there has been some degree of consolidation -- Interestingly, in the midst of this crisis, two traditional center-right parties -- the Motherland Party and the True Path Party -- have merged, have adopted the name of the Democrat Party, which was closed down in 1960 after the coup. So they've consolidated on the center-right and have some hopes that they would get over the ten percent. There's been some degree of consolidation on the center-left between the RPP and the Democratic Left Party of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. So, clearly, the opposition -- the political opposition -- is trying to gather itself to challenge the JDP in the campaign and, hopefully, from their point of view, in the National Assembly. But nonetheless, let us not lose sight of the fact that there is an extraparliamentary challenge to the JDP. We saw that in the streets in these five massive demonstrations by secularists, who said, clearly, that they did not want -- Not only did they not want somebody from the JDP in the presidential palace, but they did not want the JDP in power, because it was a threat to the secular system. We also have this extraparliamentary challenge from the Constitutional Court, which might still come into play as we proceed, and also from the military. So we have to keep an eye on the campaign and the elections, which are set for July 22nd, but also look at everything else that's happening on the stage as well.

Host: John Glenn, let's turn and talk a little bit about how this all affects the debate that's going on over Turkey's path into the European Union. How does what happens in this political crisis affect the accession talks?

Glenn: Sure, sure. Well, it's interesting. I think that if you step back a little bit, it's kind of remarkable that Turkey's membership in the E.U. is at this point such a public political issue. There is no one who expects that Turkey would be able to join the E.U., in the best of circumstances, in less than, say, ten years. So why does it matter now what could happen in ten years for Turkey? And I think the answer is because in the E.U. right now there's a tremendous debate about where it's going to go. After the failure of the constitutional referendum in France and in the Netherlands, there's a huge question in the E.U.'s mind -- What sort of institution will they be? What sort of future will they have? And Turkey, in many ways, represents that debate. We know that Nicolas Sarkozy, the newly elected French president, is not in favor of Turkish membership in the E.U. We know that France amended its constitution recently to say that after Bulgaria and Romania joined, all future enlargements must be approved by popular referendum. We know that Angela Merkel, in Germany, does not support Turkey's membership in the E.U. Turkey represents, in some ways, one of the greatest -- in the minds of some, let me say -- a greatest threat. Turkey is a Muslim country. Is the E.U. a Christian club? Turkey has eighty million people or so in it. It would immediately become one of the larger players within the E.U. What role would that play? And so I think it's become a kind of political football, as we would say in the United States, or a symbol for what that means. And I think that at the same time, it's just far too early. The accession talks are going on in a more calm way.

Host: Bulent Aliriza, does this question of how Europe will -- whether or not Europe is going to accept Turkey into the club, does that affect the political debate within Turkey about what happens in this particular constitutional crisis?

Aliriza: Oh, very much so. In fact, I would argue that we would not be having this current crisis if the E.U. process had not slowed down. From the moment it came in, the JDP went out of its way -- on the very day of the election, in fact -- to say that the first goal was to seek accession in the E.U. That was a signal to those who were skeptical about the JDP's goals that, unlike the Islamists in the past, it would look to the West and complete or seek to complete the process of Westernization which Kemal Ataturk had begun. And that served them well. A lot of skeptics said, "Look, let's give them the benefit of the doubt. They are trying to join the E.U." Parallel to that, there were a series of reforms, not least involving the civilian-military relationship, in order to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria for membership in the European Union. That slowed down because of the feeling within E.U. capitals that the process was going too fast, as has just been described. On the feeling on the part of the Europeans that maybe Turkey, most of its landmass being outside -- Asia -- among other things, rather than in Europe, was not a country that ought to be just brought in automatically, like others had been. Every country that began accession talks eventually joined. Turkey may well be an exception. And the impact of that domestically, the slowing down, was skepticism within Turkey about whether the E.U. would ever allow Turkey in, resistance to the reforms that were being demanded by -- additional reforms that were demanded by the Europeans, to the point now that people are marching in the streets, saying no to the E.U. and no to the United States. There is a nationalist wave in Turkey, and we don't know how that's going to play out in the campaign. And so, frankly, the E.U. process and it slowing down and the outcome of the political crisis in Turkey are very much linked.

Host: And yet, John Glenn, the U.S. has been vocal in its support for Turkey to join the E.U. And why is that important to U.S. policy?

Glenn: Well, Turkey, one must of course always remember, is a member of NATO. And for the United States, where Europe might see Turkey in cultural terms, in terms of its Muslim identity, I think the United States sees Turkey in strategic terms. It sees Turkey as a bulwark in the Middle East, as a border country in the Middle East -- bordering Iraq -- as a country that has strong ties to the region that, in an ideal world, could play a valuable role as an interlocutor between the West and the Middle East. And I think that the U.S. has always had a very clear, very firm policy that it believes it would be best for Turkey to be firmly anchored in the West, and the best way to do that is by being a member of the European Union. And indeed, Turkey first applied to join the European Union in 1959 or 1960, if I'm not mistaken. So this has a much longer tradition to it. It's not the first time. This is the first time, however, Turkey has been recognized as doing so.

Host: Bulent Aliriza, is there a role for U.S. policy in promoting Turkey in the E.U. and in promoting democracy in Turkey?

Aliriza: I think, with the E.U., it may even be counterproductive because, ultimately, the difference between the U.S. and the E.U. is that the U.S. has indeed looked at Turkey in strategic terms, but the Europeans think in terms of membership of their club, okay? As, I think, it was the former German foreign minister who said, "Turkey's not applying to join the United States. It's applying to join the European Union." So, you know, "Leave it to us. We have to decide on this issue." And, frankly, the Europeans are perceived to be caring more about the internal developments of Turkey -- notwithstanding the statements that have been made by U.S. officials -- and how Turkey governs itself and how it engages in the kind of reforms that is has been engaging, than the United States. The U.S. has indeed committed itself to supporting Turkey's E.U. membership. But even if the E.U. was to say no, the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship would continue in one form or another. Whereas if the E.U. says no to Turkey, what I think we're gonna see is a massive resurgence of the identity crisis -- the emergence of the identity crisis that we had in Turkey and "Where does Turkey belong?" And the idea of this huge country right on the fault line between Islam -- the Islamic world and the Western world -- being committed to the West through its membership of NATO, but nonetheless most of its people being Muslims -- between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe is going to be a headache for everybody involved, including the U.S. officials.

Host: John Glenn, we have about 30 seconds left. What's your sense on how this identity crisis will play out in Turkey?

Glenn: I think we've identified the two angles which will play. I think we see on the one hand the U.S.'s angle has to do with how we manage Iraq. Has to do with the Kurdish question, which is so critical to Turkey. The European question has to do with a more cultural question, has to do with Turkey's identity in a broader sense. I may be more optimistic. I'm hopeful that Turkish democratic institutions can be strong enough. Then we have to step back and take a look at the long view, look at the longer process by which Turkey is evolving, by which its institutions are consolidating, and by which relations will continue on both a strategic basis, but also a close economic basis.

Host: Bulent Aliriza, I'll give you the last word. And your sense -- optimistic or no on that question?

Aliriza: In the very long run, optimistic. In the short run, somewhat pessimistic.

Host: Well, that's gonna have to be the last word for today. I'd like to thank my guests for joining me. Bulent Aliriza of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and John K. Glenn of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our Web site at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For "On The Line," I'm Eric Felten.