Transcript
Host: This is "On The Line,” and I'm Eric Felten. Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, is abandoning an effort to crack down on the country's independent media. Mr. Musharraf had issued a presidential decree giving the government the power to cancel broadcasters' licenses and seize their equipment. The media regulations provoked outrage and led to a week of large-scale peaceful protests. Mr. Musharraf was moved to censor broadcasts in the first place because of their thoroughgoing coverage of other protests. Demonstrators have taken to the streets to denounce the President for firing the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The judge has been traveling around Pakistan, rallying supporters who call for him to be reinstated.
The U-S relies heavily on Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror. Critics have accused President George W. Bush of turning a blind eye to anti-democratic actions of Mr. Musharraf's regime. President Bush says his administration is pushing as hard as is practical for democratic change in Pakistan and elsewhere:
President Bush: "The United States is also using our influence to urge valued partners like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to move toward freedom. These nations have taken brave stands and strong action to confront extremists, along with some steps to expand liberty and transparency. Yet they have a great distance still to travel."
Host: State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said that the U.S. would not pressure Mr. Musharraf to reinstate Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudhry:
McCormack: "The Pakistani people are going to have to resolve this issue for themselves. They are going to have to decide for themselves whether or not rule of law has been followed, whether or not proper procedures have been followed. It's not something that we can dictate nor want to dictate to the Pakistani people."
Host: President Bush says that the United States will focus on encouraging systematic change:
President Bush: "The United States will continue to press nations like these to open up their political systems and give greater voice to their people. Inevitably, this creates tension. But our relationships with these countries are broad enough and deep enough to bear it. As our relationships with South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War prove, America can maintain a friendship and push a nation toward democracy at the same time."
Host: Will the ongoing protests in Pakistan lead to change, and if so, to change of what sort? I'll ask my guests -- Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow for South Asia at the Heritage Foundation; Frederic Grare, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and joining us by phone from Madrid, Spain, Ahmed Rashid, journalist and author of the book "Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.” And joining us by phone from Hay-on-Wye, Wales, Irfan Husain, a columnist with The Dawn and The Daily Times newspapers in Pakistan. Welcome, everyone. Thanks for joining us today.
Frederic Grare, has opposition to Pervez Musharraf's regime in Pakistan been galvanized by these protests?
Grare: Well, to some extent, yes and no. What we've seen is not so much a regime which is greatly sitting under popular pressure but a regime which is literally imploding. I mean, interference into the judiciary are by no means something new in Pakistan, and yet this is the first time that we see that sort of reaction. So, to witness the emergence, probably, of a civil society, it does tell us a lot about the exasperation at the popular level, but, at the same time, it tells much more about the inherent witness of the regime. I mean, for years this regime has been supported under the pretext that it control under the pressure of the extremists. Therefore, the first time we see just lawyers saying that they want the end of the violations of rule of law, the end of the violations of the constitution, and all the sudden, the regime makes mistakes after mistakes. So, where we are today is not exactly clear in this regard, but what it does tell is that the regime is probably more fragile, inherently fragile, than we saw it was initially.
Host: Let me ask Ahmed Rashid. Are you there by phone?
Rashid: Yes, I am.
Host: Would you agree with Frederic Grare that the regime is imploding?
Rashid: Yes, I think it is. I think the -- I think critically, the establishment is very divided. You've got the lawyers and the judiciary, plus the bureaucracy and the media, as well as civil society, all on the side of the Chief Justice opposing the military. Backing Musharraf now, basically, is the army, which is significant support, obviously, the business community, and a motley group of politicians, many of whom are trying to jump ship right now. So, I think this is the first time that Pakistanis are seeing that the judicial judges and lawyers comprising a very significant part of the establishment which have always kowtowed to military rule in the past have come out so openly. And I think on the fragility side, I think, yes, the regime has shown its fragility, and, you know, Musharraf has shown his consistency or his inconsistency by pushing through this ordinance on media control and then withdrawing it all of a sudden. And what is clear from that is that there is this high level of inconsistency as to what he's doing. You can't predict anything on what the guy will do, and I think that shows both fragility and a lack of any kind of strategy.
Host: Well, Lisa Curtis, how are people in Washington, in the Bush administration -- How are they reading what's going on in Pakistan, and how is it affecting decisions being made about what to do with regard to support for Pervez Musharraf?
Curtis: Well, I think the U.S. is taking a very cautious approach. They don't want to do anything that will disrupt stability in Pakistan, and, of course, President Musharraf has been a supporter of the U.S. counterterrorism efforts. So, they're very much concerned about that situation. However, there are risks to blindly supporting one man in the face of these protests in Pakistan, and as he loses legitimacy with the Pakistani population, if the U.S. is not seen to be adjusting its policies to what's happening on the ground, anti-American sentiment is sure to increase. We already have a problem in Pakistan in terms of the people not supporting the war on terrorism and what's happening in Afghanistan. So, I think this is a real danger for the U.S. policy. I think a better policy is to support the principles of democracy -- civilian freedoms, press freedoms, et cetera -- and you saw the administration beginning to do this when they spoke out against the clampdown on the media last week, and, of course, President Musharraf has responded. He lifted those press restrictions, and he lifted cases against about two-hundred journalists. The journalists had defied a ban to rally in Islamabad. So, I think that shows that there can be a positive impact on the situation when the U.S. stands up for democratic principles and demonstrates that it's interested in the broader population of Pakistan and what happens and it's not just putting all its eggs in one basket.
Host: Irfan Husain, are you there by phone?
Husain: Yes, I am.
Host: What's your sense of how much this situation being driven by, domestically, what's going on in Pakistan and what impact outside influence -- for example, the United States -- has?
Husain: Well, it's mostly domestic-driven, but I think in a perfect world, Musharraf would announce that he's going to retire after the election and he would supervise fair polls and then leave politicians to get on with electing the next president. In that situation, I think the American government could perhaps be helpful, but I don't think that's going to happen, and I think there will be mostly protests before Musharraf decides to call it a day. And I'm sorry I missed Ahmed Rashid's reply -- I couldn't hear him -- but I hope I'm not repeating something he might have said. But I do feel that this whole thing has to be resolved domestically, and your first speaker, Dr. Frederic Grare, I think, mentioned this. It should be resolved within Pakistan by Pakistanis, and the Americans, I think, should, if anything, withdraw their support or lessen their open-ended support to Musharraf. But I don't think they can be seen to interfere.
Host: Well, Frederic Grare, according to the News, a daily newspaper in Pakistan, Musharraf met recently with Parliamentary leaders of his own party, and he berated them, quoting them from the News, the way they quoted his statement -- He supposedly said, "I feel disturbed for the first time. I see the party nowhere. You're not mobilized. You're not delivering. You've lost the war of nerves. You are all silent upon what the media is doing. If I have to do everything myself, then you are for what purpose?” Is that a sort of accurate reading of where, politically, Musharraf is at this point? Does he have any public support happening at this point?
Grare: Well, I think that this is very telling about the isolation of the man and about the mental isolation of the man just as well, because when you have somebody telling, in the head of things, "I have to do everything by myself,” then I suppose there is a problem somewhere. But politically, it is quite clear that the only constituency which is actually left to General Pervez Musharraf is the army itself. So far, he had two to some extent. He had the P-M-L-Q, or the King's Party, Pakistan Muslim League, Quaid-i-Azam faction. And he had, to some extent, the M-Q-M, the Muttahida Quami Movement, which is a party representing the muhajir in Pakistan -- migrant from India in Pakistan. But after the May 12th carnage in Karachi, where some more than forty people were killed, I mean, the M-Q-M --
Host: Protesters who had --
Grare: There were protesters but not simply protestors. I mean, there was clearly a setup. After this carnage, he has lost even more support than he probably expected. That backfired both for Musharraf and for the M-Q-M, and he's left with no support but the army, so the army, again, will be the ultimate target of the situation.
Host: Well, Ahmed Rashid, let me ask you, do you think that at this point Musharraf -- He pulled back on the media law. Is he in a position to reverse himself on the suspension of the Chief Justice and sort of get this situation resolved for himself, or is it too late?
Rashid: No, I think his whole character and personality is that he is not going to reverse this or do a U-turn. I think he's digging in. He's already said that he's going to contest the next presidential elections in uniform, which is defying what the U.S. has said and what other people have said. I think, you know, a lot of his advisers have been telling him that he should perhaps now take on a more reconciliatory tone with the opposition, with the lawyers, perhaps reinstate the Chief Justice and try and defuse tension. But I think on the big issue of the Chief Justice and of the political movement, which is now very clearly against him, he's just not prepared to bend. And I think if he does bend later rather than sooner, then it will certainly be too late, because after that, people are just not going to accept him to become president again.
Host: Lisa Curtis, so much of the support for Musharraf in the U.S. has been predicated on the notion that he stood between the rise of militant Islamic parties in Pakistan and that by supporting him, that movement could be kept from growing too strong, and yet now there seems to be more of an argument coming out that by his continued undemocratic rule, that that is driving support for more militant parties. What's the sense in Washington these days? How are people reading that equation?
Curtis: Well, I think this is really an inaccurate depiction -- the idea that somehow President Musharraf stands between Pakistan turning into an Islamic fundamentalist state and he's the only break on that happening. I think that's very inaccurate. In fact, by co-opting the religious parties and working with the religious parties, they were able to garner more of the vote in the 2002 elections than they had been in any of the previous elections. Previously, they'd only gotten about six, seven percent of the Pakistani vote. In the 2002 elections, they got about eleven percent. This was in part, of course, because they didn't like the war in Afghanistan and some anti-American sentiment, but it was also partly because President Musharraf decided to favor the religious parties over the mainstream, secular democratic parties. So, you really have an awkward situation here where he's clamping down on those parties that actually support his vision of a moderate, enlightened Pakistan and yet allowing the religious elements more freedom. You look at what happened in the North Waziristan agency -- the peace deals that President Musharraf made with the militants that support the Taliban. And a lot of people would argue that this situation has allowed the Taliban more free rein in these areas and contributed to Talibanization of these parts of the country. So, I don't think it's quite as cut and dried as President Musharraf would like to portray it to U.S. officials in Washington, and I think this is becoming clearer in that people are understanding there is a movement to restore democratic rule in the country and that our U.S. long-term interests are better served by supporting such a long-term vision of Pakistan rather than focusing on short-term-interest needs of the day.
Host: Irfan Husain, what's your sense of what a democratic Pakistan looks like if that happens?
Husain: I think if there are free elections -- and there's a big “if” here -- I think you'll have mainstream parties like the People's Party and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League, which are basically centrist or slightly-right-of-center parties who would then form the next government, and I think these parties would not want fundamentalists any more than anybody else does, really. So, I think you would have a broad coalition of politicians and civil society aligned against fundamentalism, and I think that is in the interest of the entire world. So, I think Musharraf needs to try and broaden his base, but I doubt if he can at this late stage. But I think if he had started with that and got people like Benazir Bhutto and Nawar Sharif alongside and formed a broad coalition, it would have been much more effective in fighting terrorism, because this fight is not just about arms. It's also about hearts and minds, about changing views, about educating people, and Musharraf can't hope to do all this on his own. So, I think a democratic Pakistan is much more in the interest of the West and the United States than one man.
Host: Well, Frederic Grare, one of the biggest worries from the U.S. point of view has been all along, "What happens with nuclear weapons in Pakistan if Pakistan becomes somehow destabilized and thus supporting a military president ruler in Pakistan as a way of avoiding any question of that?” How big a concern is that at this point?
Grare: I don't know how big a concern it is for Washington, but I think that whatever concern there is, they are largely exaggerated for a single reason. I mean, why should a democratic Pakistan be inherently unstable to start with? And a democratic Pakistan doesn't mean a Pakistan who is without an army, and, undoubtedly, the army will remain a key element? And the army will be in charge of precisely the nuclear parameters, the nuclear establishment, and so on. And I don't see any serious reason to fear a democratic Pakistan than there is to fear a military Pakistan. After all, as Lisa just said, if we're in the situation that we are now, this is largely as a result of military policies. So, if there is a concern that the people that we fear so much may take over the nuclear weapon one day, then we have to get the right conclusion and say, “If the military are responsible for that situation, perhaps it will be time to think about policy to make sure that they get out of political power.” Again, in every normal state, there is an army. They're a responsibility which are constitutionally defined and so on. There is a constitution in Pakistan, and therefore there is no reason to believe that it should be different than in any other country.
Host: Ahmed Rashid, what's your sense of the ability to make a post-Musharraf transition to something rather more democratic without creating instability?
Rashid: I think it is absolutely possible. It can't be done with Musharraf. It probably has to be done with a new army chief and an interim government that will oversee a genuinely free and fair election. Now, there's no doubt that the next government that comes into power, the civilian government, will have to strike a deal with the army, and the army's not going to disappear overnight. It's not going to, you know, go back to its barracks. It's going to maintain an interest in policymaking on security issues, the war on terror, India, Afghanistan, et cetera. And I think a deal is wholly possible, because we have seen the important politicians in exile say that -- People like Benazir Bhutto saying that they're willing to do a deal with the army if only there are certain benchmarks, that the civilian government should be an empowered government, not like the government that Musharraf has already. And I think -- You know, I just want to add one thing to what Lisa said earlier. I mean, the other major misconception, I think, in Washington is that -- You know, the earlier clip you ran of President Bush where he lumps Saudi Arabia with Egypt and Pakistan -- Pakistan is not a state that has never seen a democratic government before. Half of Pakistan's life, after all, has been under democratic dispensation, the whole legacy of the British colonial system, the Parliamentary way of government, et cetera, et cetera. So, Pakistanis are very well versed in democratic government, which is precisely why they're out in the streets, why you've got lawyers out in the streets arguing for democracy and constitutionalism. So, I think the misconception that somehow Pakistan is this fundamentalist state which has always been ruled by mullahs or by generals and has never seen democracy is also a very false one, and I think this really needs to be rectified and better understood.
Host: I'm afraid that's going to --
Rashid: We are not in the same category as Saudi Arabia.
Host: I'm afraid that's going to have to be the last word. We're out of time, I'm afraid. But I'd like to thank my guests, Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation, Frederic Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and joining us by phone from Madrid, Spain, author and journalist Ahmed Rashid, and joining us by phone from Wales, columnist Irfan Husain. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our website at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For "On The Line,” I'm Eric Felten.