Transcript

Host: This is "On The Line,” and I'm Eric Felten. The U.S. and Russia are at odds over U.S. and European plans to build a missile defense system based in Poland and the Czech Republic. The system is meant to protect against the potential threat posed by the efforts of Iran and others to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Meeting with President George W. Bush in Maine, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that Russia and the U.S. could cooperate on a missile defense system and build it primarily on Russian territory. Mr. Bush commented on their talks:

President Bush: "Do I trust him? Yeah, I trust him. Do I like everything he says? No. And I suspect he doesn't like everything I say. But we're able to say it in a way that shows mutual respect. Take missile defense. He just laid out a vision. I think it's very sincere, I think it's innovative, I think it's strategic. But, as I told Vladimir, I think that Czech Republic and Poland need to be an integral part of a system."

Host: Mr. Bush says that preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons is in both the U.S. and Russia's interest:

President Bush: "I have come to the conclusion that when Russia and America speaks with -- you know, along the same lines, it tends to have an effect, and therefore I appreciate very much the Russian attitude in the United Nations. I have been counting on the Russian support to send a clear message to the Iranians, and that support and that message is a strong message."

Host: The dispute over the proposed missile shield comes as relations between the West and Russia are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. U.S. and European leaders have expressed concern at Russia's crackdown on dissent and growing authoritarianism. England is trying to extradite a former KGB agent from Russia on charges he used a radioactive element to poison a dissident Russian expatriate in London. And Estonia recently suffered a coordinated electronic attack on its computer infrastructure, an Internet assault that appears to have originated in Russia.

What are the prospects for U.S.-Russia relations, and how will the U.S. deal with the issues that now divide the two countries? I'll ask my guests -- Ambassador James Collins, former U.S. ambassador to Russia and now director of the Russian and Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and David Satter, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, research fellow at the Hoover Institution, and a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Welcome and thanks for joining us today.

Ambassador James Collins, what's your sense of the meeting between President Putin and President George W. Bush? Were these issues that were on the table things that could be resolved through personal diplomacy?

Collins: Well, I think in the broader context, this was one of a series of meetings. I gather it will not be the last. They'll at least get together once again in Asia. And I think it was not a meeting meant to produce breakthroughs. It produced good discussions of central issues, some of which you've already heard about. In my view, the single most important outcome of this was not necessarily what they talked about at the meeting but rather what this meeting generated between the two governments, which was very substantial new agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation and, apparently, a commitment to go forward now with a post -- start strategic arms arrangement. I think that may be well the most significant outcome of this particular meeting when we look at it in retrospect.

Host: David Satter, what's your sense of the most significant thing out of this meeting?

Satter: Well, uh, the -- the, uh -- the actions or the agreements that were mentioned by Ambassador Collins are significant. I think that the symbolism of the meeting is unfortunate because it comes after Putin compared the United States to the Third Reich in his speech May 9th in celebration of Victory Day in Russia. And after the refusal of the Russian authorities to extradite a suspect in the murder of Aleksander Litvinenko. So, in a sense, what I see as the most significant result of this meeting is the signal that we've given to Russia that, in fact, they can behave with impunity on a range of issues, that they can continue anti-American propaganda, that they can refuse to cooperate with the processes of law enforcement in the West and effectively condone the murder of innocent people on British or American territory, and I think that's the mistake. It shows that President Bush, for his part, has learned nothing as a result of his experiences during the last five or six years with President Putin, that he continues to believe that the problems between the United States and Russian can be resolved on the basis of a so-called friendship, which is not a friendship at all.

Host: Ambassador Collins, what do you think about that? Has the signal been sent to Russia that they can act with impunity toward the U.S. and the rest of the West?

Collins: Well, I don't quite look at it in the same way. I think, certainly, that there will be those who will take it that way. But, after all, what we have watched over the last six, seven years, as Mr. Putin has been president of Russia, has been the recovery of Russia economically, in many ways, re-establishment of a political system that has given greater stability to the country, along with many steps by the Putin administration and Putin government that have limited previous democratics, freedoms, certain civil rights, freedom of the press. Nobody would argue with that. And I don't think anybody should be in doubt that we're not condoning this. But Russia is there. It's a country that is now developing its own answers to many of its own problems. I think it's been very unfortunate to have a collapse, if you will, in the rhetoric over the last many months to a really low level. But, at the same time, going along with that, you have had a contentinuity* of cooperation in areas where we both have vital interests at stake, like nonproliferation, many of the aspects of the war against terrorism, so it's neither an all-black nor an all-white picture. And I think one doesn't have to agree with Mr. Putin in all respects, as Mr. Bush said, but I think the idea that we can simply not deal with Russia effectively on the areas of vital interests to the United States or that we have to conduct ourselves in a way that somehow complicates that for us significantly is simply not wise diplomacy.

Host: Well, David Satter, what's your sense of how the U.S. should be dealing with Russia? What is wise diplomacy?

Satter: Well, I think there's no question that we should be dealing with Russia in a sober and objective way concerning those areas in which we have mutual interests. After all, the United States cooperated with the Soviet Union, which was far more hostile and threatening to the United States and to the West than Russia is today. But the point is do we want to continually make really senseless gestures which have the effect of giving Russia and giving Russia's actions a legitimacy they don't deserve, especially when we bear in mind that there are forces in Russia which are anxious for support from the West or support from the United States in their efforts to defend democracy in Russia and to protest against the very actions which are inimical to our interests as well. The idea that Putin deserves special treatment, that he deserves to be invited not only to the United States for what was, in fact, an unnecessary summit but to Bush's family home, the home of his father, and the constant referring to Putin by his first name, which, as we've seen, Bush mispronounces. And all of this really gives, to the Russian side, the impression that the West and, in particular, President Bush can be manipulated, that this relationship can be used to distract Bush from the really unsavory objectives in foreign policy of the present leadership in Russia.

Host: Let me ask Ambassador Collins. Is your sense that in Russia people are looking at these cues and it affects the ability of democratic reformers, people who are still trying to push for press freedom in Russia, that it affects their willingness to take the risks to push for that?

Collins: Well, I don't know how it affects their willingness to take the risks for that. I think there's no question that many of those who have stood for, I would say, the sort of westernizing and opening of Russia to the outside world find it unhelpful to have opponents of those ideas as they see, in many cases, Mr. Putin and some of his colleagues. In a sense, given support from the West, at least implicitly, i.e. that we are not simply joining the opposition to Mr. Putin's government. Now, I know they would very much like us to do that, but it's not realistic for a foreign government to become a member of the Russian opposition. You know, we can say what we stand for, and I think if there's anything that would be helpful, quite frankly, it would be less criticism of Russia, per se, and much more emphasis on what we believe is essential to have a good relationship, strategically and long-term, with Russia. But the fact of the matter is we are going to continue to deal with Russia on many different levels because it is of vital interest of the United States to do so. And so I would argue that gratuitously not to do the thing -- or to do things that, in a sense, poke it in the Russian eye and make it harder for us to do that is no less counterproductive than perhaps going overboard in some instances on embracing Mr. Putin and his government in a way that may give some the impression that we support everything he does. Now, Bush has said he doesn't do that, but I agree the symbols are not always consistent with the words.

Host: Well, David Satter, even though Russia has been very prickly when criticized on human rights issues, a month ago President Bush made a point of giving a speech in which he said, "In Russia, reforms that once promised to empower citizens have been derailed with troubling implications for democratic development.” Has President Bush just not gone far enough in repeating this sort of thing, or has he gone far enough in making that an issue?

Satter: I don't think it's a question of that. I think it's a question of avoiding really empty shows of friendship and goodwill that don't correspond to the real situation or to the behavior, either of Russia internally, toward its own citizens, or toward other countries, because not only does it cloud the international perception of what Russia is and what it's doing and not only does it discourage people inside Russia, but it confuses our own people, who lose a sense of the extent to which Russia is behaving in a manner that's really contrary to the interests of the United States and is seeking to sell their cooperation in a manner that's unacceptable to us. And this is something that we need to keep in mind, and we need to express it not only for the sake of the internal evolution in Russia but simply in order to make it clear to the Russians that their behavior is unacceptable, that they're not going to be able to prosper in the world and in their relationship with the West if they keep it up. We see it for what it is, and we intend to not to indulge it.

Host: Ambassador Collins, let's talk a little bit about this issue of cooperation and what the price of cooperation is and how much cooperation there is on the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Russia has been very involved in selling nuclear technology to Iran. How much leverage does Russia have over Iran's program, and how much of what leverage it does have is it willing to use to keep Iran from developing a nuclear program that could be used for nuclear weapons?

Collins: Well, I mean, first of all, I'm not privy to all of the intelligence and all the information that may give you a detailed answer, but I would say the following about the Iranian-Russian relationship -- on nuclear matters, now. I think there's a very different relationship today from what there was five, six years ago. I think it reflects three different things that have happened, and I think the basis of the relationship is fundamentally altered. First one is I think the Russians who defended the idea that they could have civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran and not have this bleed over into a broader Iranian program for the nuclear fuel cycle and, potentially, weaponry got a very rude shock two years ago at Nantaz, when it was discovered that they were, in fact, working on enrichment. This, I think, was a real shock to the Russian nuclear community. Second, I think, though, and even more profoundly, the Russian government, about a year ago or year and a half ago, began a total restructuring of the entire nuclear complex in Russia. And that is being, basically, split up into a weapons and regulatory structure and then a large company, state-owned, that will manage the civilian commercial nuclear world. In order to succeed, that company is going to have to become a major part of the global nuclear suppliers' community and adopt, basically, those values or it isn't gonna work. They can have the bottom-feeders to themselves if they want to isolate themselves, but if they want to play in the global community, they're gonna have to adopt the rules. And, finally, frankly, the Russians are getting much less value, in some sense, out of the Iranian nuclear relationship than they did before. In the earlier period, the '90s, even up in the first years of this decade, in many ways, the Iranian payment to the nuclear community was, I would say, life support for that community. There wasn't any other real big income stream. There were a couple, but, I mean, that was a major factor. That just isn't true anymore. I mean, at sixty and seventy-dollar-a-barrel oil, they have money. They are now in a position to restructure. So I would say the basic point here is the Russians have agreed with us on two things now, basically. They don't want Iran to have a nuclear-weapons program or nuclear weapons, and they think that there are certainly elements of what the Iranians are doing that are counter to the nonproliferation regime and so forth.

Host: Let me ask David --

Collins: Therefore, they are now, I would say, on a similar wavelength, where we may disagree as about what you do -- sanctions.

Host: David Satter, U.S. and Russia on the same wavelength?

Satter: Well, I think that it may well be true that the Russians have made some verbal acknowledgements of what was obvious for a long time, but it's hard for me to accept that they're on the same wavelength as long as they do as much as they do to frustrate economic sanctions against Iran and cooperate with Iranian-backed elements like Hezbollah in the Middle East. The whole pattern of Russian behavior suggests that, in fact, they are trying to assert themselves at the expense of the security of the whole world and the security of the West. We have, on the one hand, the support for Iran diplomatically in the fact that they sold antiaircraft missiles, which will be used to guard the nuclear sites in Iran and which would definitely pose a problem were, for example, Israel to decide to take those sites out, all of which increases -- Actually has the effect of increasing tension in the area. It's Russia that was the source of the antitank weapons that were used by Hezbollah with such devastating effect in the Lebanon war. They were sold to Syria, but it's simply out of the question that Russia didn't know where they were going and how they would be used and are being used. And they welcomed Hamas to Moscow, and we've seen what Hamas is. So all of this suggests that they're flirting with the most dangerous force in the world today, which is Islamic fanaticism, and making the world less secure and less stable for their own, really, silly purposes -- I mean, purposes of national vanity, trying to assert a claim to great power status that they lost with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Host: Ambassador Collins, do you think Russia is making decisions based, at this point, not really on their national interests, per se, but rather out of these issues of vanity, of trying to re-establish a sense of being a great power?

Collins: I think that's much overrated, frankly. I think if you look for where are the real decisions being made, first of all, I think there's a problem in Russia deciding what its national interest is in many cases, but in the end, what I've seen more as the motivating factor in a lot of the policy decisions that are controversial is basically competitive business and, if you will, simply a determination to push forward Russian commercial economic interest and advance it. And if you look at most of the issues that are being discussed here, they tend to reflect a commercial interest on the part of some piece of the Russian puzzle. It's not one Soviet united bureaucracy anymore. It is many different groups.

Host: We have about 30 seconds.

Collins: That's, I think, where you're seeing the interest expressed.

Host: We have about 30 seconds left. Has the U.S. got a sense now, a strategy, for how to deal with its relationship with Russia? David Satter.

Satter: Well, it obviously hasn't. I mean, the meeting in Kennebunkport shows that. The only way, really, to deal with Russia now is to speak honestly to Russia, and that's not happening.

Host: I'm afraid that's gonna have to be the last word for today. We're out of time, but I'd like to thank my guests, Ambassador James Collins of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and David Satter of the Hudson Institute and the Hoover Institution. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our website at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For "On The Line,” I'm Eric Felten.