Transcript

Host: This is "On The Line,” and I'm Eric Felten.

Terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists continue to be a serious threat around the world. In Pakistan, troops raided a mosque where hundreds of Muslim extremists had barricaded themselves. Their leader, chief cleric at the mosque, Maulana Abdul Aziz, threatened to unleash a wave of suicide bombings in Pakistan. He was captured by Pakistani security forces while trying to escape dressed as a woman, wearing a burka.

In southern Afghanistan, a dozen children and at least five adults were killed with a car bomb. There have been more than sixty such attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan so far this year. Just days earlier, two men drove a Jeep loaded with fuel canisters into the entrance of the Glasgow, Scotland, airport. They set the truck on fire, but it failed to explode. The men are believed to be part of the terror cell that left two car bombs in central London rigged to explode in front of a crowded nightclub. Those bombs proved to be faulty and were disarmed by police. Elsewhere, several men were arrested in the U.S. and the Caribbean, accused of plotting to ignite jet-fuel tanks at New York's Kennedy Airport.

In a speech at the Islamic Center in Washington, D.C., President George W. Bush said that extremists “claim to undertake these acts of butchery and mayhem in the name of Allah. Yet this enemy is not the true face of Islam. This enemy is the face of hatred.”

How has the terrorist threat posed by Islamic extremists evolved since the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001? Are U.S. policy and tactics evolving to meet the threat? I'll ask my guests -- Angel Rabasa, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and author of the recent book "Building Moderate Muslim Networks,” and Walter Andersen, Acting Director of the South Asia Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. And joining us by phone from London, Irfan Husain, a columnist for the Pakistani newspapers The Dawn and The Daily Times. Welcome. Thanks for joining us today.

Angel Rabasa, is terrorist violence spreading at this point?

Rabasa: To understand the problem of terrorism, I think you have to see it in terms of concentric circles. At the core, you have, of course, Al Qaeda, bin Laden, and its immediate circle. Beyond that, there are a series of organizations, what we call the global jihadist movement, that are linked to Al Qaeda but operate regionally, and they are linked to Al Qaeda by ideology. So, what we have seen is, in a sense, the spread of terrorism but really the continuation of a pattern that has been more and more evident over the last three or four years, where the Al Qaeda core has been trying to reach out and contextualize local terrorist struggles into a global jihad.

Host: Irfan Husain, are you there by phone?

Husain: Yes, I am.

Host: What's your sense of whether terrorism is growing or staying the same in the Pakistani region?

Husain: I think there are two strands here. You've got Kashmiri terrorists, for instance, who are Muslims, but their struggle is more nationalistic -- they want their own homeland -- whereas you have another group of Muslim terrorists who are trying to achieve an Islamic state in Pakistan. Yet another group, the Al Qaeda -- Al Qaeda, of course, is the global superfranchise, but then you have the Taliban in Afghanistan who currently are trying to get the foreign troops out of Afghanistan, as well as to re-establish the Islamic state, so you've got these different strands. The common element is, of course, the faith, but they're all trying for different ends, if you like.

Host: Walter Andersen, what about that? The different aims, if you will -- We see in London, at one point, the attacks were, from a couple of years ago, on buses because of involvement in Iraq, and now this new round of attempted bombings we see aimed at nightclubs -- people going to parties -- and yet all being done in the name of Islam. Is there anything else that unifies this?

Andersen: Actually, I tend to agree with you. You're getting a kind of contextualization by groups that aren't necessarily linked closely to Al Qaeda, a kind of homegrown variety taking some kind of inspiration from Al Qaeda but not necessarily directions. I suspect, from what I read, this is the case in the most recent events in the U.K. It was certainly the case, too, as we're increasingly finding out about the bombings that took place in Mumbai in the summer of last year, where there was homegrown varieties of people who were involved and who took inspiration but not necessarily direction. Now, the problem is governments tend -- and the Indian government tends to do this, as well -- is that the default mechanism is to accuse, in the Indian case, Pakistan for that when this may not necessarily be the case. In fact, I think we're finding in India and elsewhere in South Asia and other places that, increasingly, it's local groups that sort of take an inspiration from it and, therefore, more difficult to control.

Host: Angel Rabasa, we see in these local attacks, whether they're in Iraq, whether they're in Afghanistan, whether they're in Pakistan -- When you look at the whole of suicide-bombing attacks over the last however many years, it seems that the majority of the people who have been victims of these attacks are themselves Muslims. What are the attitudes among Muslim communities around the world at this point toward this kind of violence?

Rabasa: It's very interesting that you make that point, because we in the West, of course, look at these attacks and we seem to focus on the casualties that take place in Western cities -- in London, in Madrid. But when you look at the overall thrust of Islamist terrorism worldwide, you see, as you point out, that the majority of the victims are Muslims, and this does cause an ideological problem for the terrorists, because killing other Muslims is not justified, so they have to find in roundabout ways some justification for what they are doing. In the case of Indonesia, it's very, very interesting, because you have there a group linked to Al Qaeda but that operates locally, the Jemaah Islamia. Jemaah Islamia has carried out a number of attacks in Indonesia -- the first Bali bombing in 2002, then the Marriott Hotel in 2003, the Australian Embassy in '04, the second Bali attack subsequently to that. What happened is that the majority of the victims -- Except for the first Bali bombing, the majority of the victims were Muslim. And this had the effect of turning the Indonesian population against Jemaah Islamia. And this had an effect, an important effect, in mobilizing the population in diminishing the legitimacy of this particular group, which is now fragmented and, even though still lethal, very much on the run. So, the fact that they are killing other Muslims, I think, is a tremendous problem for the terrorists that, I think, over a long time will tend to reduce their legitimacy and acceptance.

Host: Irfan Husain, is there anything to learn from the Indonesian case elsewhere?

Husain: I think the way these terrorists rationalize killing other Muslims is to say that these people are siding with the West. For instance, Pakistani terrorists have been trying to kill Musharraf and attack his government whenever they can. They rationalize that, saying that he is acting on behalf of Bush and therefore attacking him and the people around him is justified. This recent incident you had of this mosque being occupied by these terrorists -- This again -- I mean, these people were saying that Musharraf is not heading an Islamic government and he should be out, and so a lot of their supporters think that this is the right way to go. Similarly, the Muslim terrorists here in Britain -- They have rationalized collateral damage as saying that the Westerners here have voted for the government, in part, and they are the government that are attacking other Muslims, and they therefore rationalize this kind of collateral damage, so there are these mental contortions, if you like, that enable them to deviate from orthodox Islamic teachings, which does not in any way condone killing innocent men or women or children. So, I think, to gain their ends, they're willing to undergo any kind of mental acrobatics.

Host: Walter Andersen, do these mental acrobatics carry weight with Muslim populations at large, or is this just something that their particular followers are willing to buy?

Andersen: It varies from place to place, depending on circumstances. For example, in Iraq, where it takes a sectarian orientation, some members of a particular sect -- Sunni, Shi'a, or whatever -- might tend to identify with what their people are doing in an act of revenge against someone else. In the case of the Mumbai bombing, for example, there was general anger on the part of both Muslims and Hindus because the killings on the train was both -- In fact, probably more Muslims were killed than Hindus, and the trains were going into a Muslim neighborhood, and so there was anger on both sides. But in terms of the perpetrators, I think they see this as perhaps something that's necessary to get the publicity that they're seeking and, in the long term, to mobilize support that they are a factor and they cannot be ignored. And, to a certain extent, you know, in some places, that tactic has worked.

Host: Walter Andersen brings up the notion of the perpetrators. Angel Rabasa, let's talk a little bit about who these perpetrators are. Now, in the case of the terrorist violence that's been done and then attempted recently in England, the attacks from two summers ago, we saw sort of disaffected youth, and much was talked about, about how do you address these problems of people who feel alienated from their societies, don't have employment, and it was seen as very much wrapped around this disaffectation. And yet now we see the attacks attempted recently -- Those who have been accused of it are doctors, are well-educated people who are well employed, having come to England and found jobs there. What does that say about the nature of the threat and those who are involved in it?

Rabasa: It's very interesting, although not at all surprising, that the perpetrators of the latest attack in Great Britain were professionals, were medical doctors, because the idea that people who are attracted to Islamist violence aren't necessarily poor, unemployed young people is wrong. It's a myth that has no basis in reality, because if you look at the structure of terrorist groups almost everywhere, you find that a very substantial number of the leadership, the operatives are upper-middle-class people, professionals, very well-educated people. Very often, they come from the technical professions. They're engineers, in this case, physicians, and what that tells you is that there is something about the ideology that's attractive to educated people. Now, I wouldn't want to generalize too much about this because the prominence of perpetrators in these terrorist attacks depends on the context, and you find, for example, that terrorists of British origin tend to be different from those on the Continent. Except for the latest attack, most of the British-born terrorists were second-generation British of Pakistani origin. On the Continent, they were of Arab origin, many of them Moroccans. So it depends on the demographic structure of a particular place. But the ideology does seem to appeal to a certain level of professionals -- well-educated people.

Host: Irfan Husain, what's your sense of how ideologically one tries to fight against the terrorists if there seems to be so many different motivations going on? In one attack, it will claim that it's because of what's going on in Iraq. In another attack, it may be that people are behaving immorally at nightclubs. How does that affect how one tries to meet the ideological message?

Husain: There was a very interesting recent study in which it was shown that most of these terrorist cells have been formed by people being inducted by either close friends or relatives. It's not the ideology as much as peer-group pressure, apparently, that's driving this phenomenon. So, that makes it all the harder, I suppose, and I think these are people who have some grievance, whether educated or not. For instance, the doctors -- One was an Iraqi who, although he'd grown up in Britain, went back to Iraq after the war started and apparently was radicalized by what he saw there, came back to Britain, and started a cell. One of the doctors was a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, so you can see that there are people with grievances, and they can attract people in their circle to join them. And ideology, I think, becomes secondary in this scenario. And as for countering the ideology, I think basically a lot of people who are marginalized by social factors, if you like -- I mean, they may feel that they're not part of the mainstream, at school they get bullied, and they don't participate in mainstream activities -- I think these people become, then, vulnerable to whatever ideology. I think forty, fifty years ago, it would have been either communism, before that, national socialism, so I think it's a frame of mind that makes people vulnerable to extreme ideologies, and this is a sociological factor more than a religious one, I suspect, which we need to be looking at.

Host: Walter Andersen, do you see people who are disaffected worldwide? At this point, we don't see, for example, people in crushing poverty someplace in Latin America turning to suicide bombing, so can it be dealt with merely in sort of sociological factors, or is there an element that has to be addressed in speaking to leaders of the Muslim community and dealing with people who are trying to use the religion as the basis, the justification, for terrorism?

Andersen: Clearly, that's what's happening, is that certain images, notions, have a salience, and there's been a sort of systematizing of terrorism and the justification for it that has a certain -- At least an attempt has been made to give a kind of Islamic coloration to it that's had some effect, though I think that I agree with what the previous speaker had said about who gets attracted to that. They really tend to be people who are somehow excluded or feel excluded, and this could often be intellectuals who feel excluded, as well. For example, if you look at 9/11, who were the perpetrators of 9/11? They were, by and large, from upper-middle-class families and tended to be well educated. But also, a sociological factor is they also had a sort of sense of alienation, social alienation. I think, for example, why the United States, to a certain extent, has not had the same kind of phenomena as in Europe, despite all the social problems we have, we tend to be a very accommodating society. Europeans tend to be far more a nationality, and it is often difficult for immigrants, such as immigrants in Pakistan and North Africa, to feel accommodated in those societies, and that has an effect.

Host: Angel Rabasa, let's talk a little bit about the actual structure of the terrorist organizations at this point. 9/11, we saw a big attack organized by a central organization. Now we're seeing lots of smaller-scale attacks done by smaller organizations. Is this the future of terrorist violence?

Rabasa: Yes. Terrorist groups have become desegregated and atomized after September 11th because of measures taken by the authorities, by the United States, friendly governments, against the structures. However, I think we might have gone too far in saying these groups are separate from each other and moved only by inspiration, because I recall that after the July 2005 London bombings that there was talk that there were no obvious connections to Al Qaeda and that the perpetrators may have been inspired. However, in each of the British cases, beginning in 2004 with the Operation Crevice, the sort of failed effort to set off car bombs throughout London, in the July bombing -- London, July 2005, bombings -- in the efforts, the failed attempt, to blow up aircraft en route from the United Kingdom to the United States, in the latest attacks, even with the Somalis, who failed July 21, 2005, to carry out the bombing attacks in London, there was always a linkage to Pakistan. In every case, one or more of the operators or the organizers of these attacks have traveled to Pakistan, have been in connection with people in Pakistan who are firmly linked to Al Qaeda, so there was an Al Qaeda linkage.

Host: Let me ask Irfan Husain -- we only have a minute left -- what about that Pakistan connection?

Husain: There is a strong connection, largely due to the fact that along the borders of Afghanistan there is a very amorphous area which is really not under anybody's control. It's sort of no-man's-land. And I think training camps have been set up there, and, of course, the Pakistan government itself has been using militants in Kashmir and earlier in Afghanistan, so there is, certainly, a kind of nexus, and it would be silly to ignore that fact. And I think there should be pressure brought to bear on Pakistan government to do everything it can to shut these things down.

Host: Walter Andersen, we've just got a few seconds left.

Andersen: Yeah. The madrassas in Pakistan are a prime source of training for these people, and one of the things is we can put pressure on Musharraf. He may be more receptive to it to get tougher on some of these madrassas, such as the one that was at the source of the problem the last couple days in Pakistan.

Host: I'm afraid that's going to have to be the last word. We're out of time for today. But I'd like to thank my guests -- Angel Rabasa of the RAND Corporation, Walter Andersen of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and joining us from London by phone was Irfan Husain, a columnist for the Pakistani newspapers The Dawn and The Daily Times. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our website at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For “On The Line,” I'm Eric Felten.