Transcript

Host: This is “On the Line,” and I’m Eric Felten.

Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, has suspended the country’s constitution and purged Pakistan’s judiciary. But President George W. Bush says that the U.S. will still engage with Pakistan’s government:

Bush: "We made it clear to the President that we would hope he wouldn’t have declared the emergency powers he declared. Now that he’s made that decision, our hope now is that he’ll hurry back to elections. And at the same time, we want to continue working with him to fight these terrorists and extremists."

Host: Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan after years in exile to campaign in parliamentary elections that had been scheduled for January. Now she is organizing opposition to what she calls Mr. Musharraf’s “second coup.” The General first came to power in a 1999 military takeover. Mr. Musharraf’s government has been an ally of the U.S. in the war on terror. But many worry that he may be dismantling the moderate secular civil society in Pakistan and empowering Islamist radicals.

How is the U.S. responding to developments in Pakistan? I’ll ask my guests: Brian Bennett, Foreign Affairs Correspondent for “Time” magazine; Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation; and joining us by phone from Karachi, Pakistan, Irfan Husain, columnist for “The Dawn” and “The Daily Times” newspapers. Welcome. Thanks for joining us.

Irfan Husain, are you there? Can you hear us?

Husain: Yes, I can.

Host: Give us a sense of what’s going on. Are there any democratic institutions left in Pakistan at this point?

Husain: First of all, I’m in Karachi. And just to tell you that a number of my friends have been arrested in the last few days in the crackdown that followed the declaration of the emergency. And human-rights activists and lawyers have been targeted. Large numbers of them have been arrested. And at the moment, everybody is reeling from the shock and just trying to develop a movement to force Musharraf back onto the democratic part that he had promised so many times. I must say, though, that after recent behavior, to expect him to actually organize free and fair elections is, I think, a bit of a stretch here. So, I don’t think that the elections are going to be very credible with the opposition now.

Host: Brian Bennett, what’s your sense of what the situation in Pakistan at this point is when President Musharraf declared this emergency, this martial law and sort of the odd double targets of saying that it was necessary because of lawyers and judges and Islamic extremists?

Bennett: When you look at the proclamation of emergency that Musharraf made, the first point is, “This is going to counteract extremists.” And every single point beyond that is about the courts. And when you look at what we can see of the actions that have been taken by the Pakistani government, it doesn’t seem like they’re spending a lot of brainpower and resources against the extremists. They’re really looking at dismantling as best they can the opposition in Pakistan -- the lawyers’ protests that we saw, have seen streamed through the news. And it’s pretty clear that his efforts and his resources of government have not been -- after the emergency -- to dismantle the extremist organizations but instead to really tamp down the opposition in the country.

Host: Lisa Curtis, is that stated first goal of declaring emergency to clamp down on extremists, is that for U.S. consumption, Western consumption?

Curtis: I think absolutely. It seems quite clear, and I think it’s widely held that Musharraf took this step mainly to avert a potentially unfavorable Supreme Court ruling against the October 6th presidential election. His claims that somehow this is going to help him fight religious militancy in his country are just not credible. Look, the judiciary was not preventing the Pakistani troops from fighting al-Qaida, Taliban elements in the northwest areas of Pakistan, especially along the border with Afghanistan. So, I think what he’s done is essentially opened two fronts. He’s taken his country down a very dangerous path. Not only is he confronting the extremists and almost daily suicide bombings, but now his security apparatus is going to be distracted because it has to focus on subduing an increasingly agitated civil society. And on top of that, he’s alienating the very elements that he needs to counter the message of the extremists. Look, people like Asma Jahangir, the head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, also an official of the U.N. -- She’s been put under house arrest. This is somebody who’s literally risked her life to counter extremism in her country. So, it’s not helpful. He needs these civilian leaders, human-rights workers, party workers -- He needs these people to fight off the brewing threat from extremism.

Host: Irfan Husain, what’s your sense of where the non-extremist, moderate center of Pakistan is and what kind of political leverage it has?

Husain: At the moment, I think everybody is so focused on what’s happening that I think we’ve lost sight of the main danger to Pakistan, which concerns the extremists. Now, Musharraf, who had claimed that this action was being taken against the extremists, clearly used this emergency to sideline the judges that were upsetting his hold on power. So, the whole thing is about his hanging on to power by any means possible. The extremists are just an excuse. And I’m afraid in the last eight years, the extremist sect has grown under him. I don’t understand how these extra powers will help him because he had the army under him anyway. And just yesterday in Swat Valley, which has been under threat now for the last few months, the militants have taken another town. It’s the third town they’ve captured. So, this is after the declaration of the emergency. So, I’m afraid that it just doesn’t hold water. And he’s locked up or really marginalized all the human-rights activists and civil society. So, I think he’s isolating himself even more, and I don’t see how there can be a partnership between him and the moderate elements after this.

Host: Brian Bennett, President Bush, in his second inaugural address, made the centerpiece of the foreign policy dealing with the threat of extremism and terrorism, pursuing democracy and freedom as an antidote to those threats. All along the way, President Musharraf has used the threat of al-Qaida coming from Pakistan to push back against Western efforts to say, “You need to move toward democracy in Pakistan.” So, where does this whole effort stand and this notion that somehow democracy is going to be what you use against extremism?

Bennett: Bush has found himself caught in the middle between his pro-democracy Bush doctrine and, in Pakistan, his efforts to fight the war on terror. Because the Bush administration officials have said, “Look, we’re supporting Musharraf, and he’s made these commitments that he’s going to take off his uniform and put his country back on the path to democracy.” And the changes that Musharraf has made in the last week clearly show -- or what the administration has characterized as a step backward -- but show that his -- Musharraf’s -- lip service to returning to democracy was exactly that. And as Mr. Husain said, really, what he seems to be interested in right now is holding on to the reins of power by any means necessary.

Host: So, what does this mean, Lisa Curtis, for U.S. policy? You have the Secretary of State getting on the phone with Musharraf, saying, “Don’t do this.” He goes ahead and he does it. What are the consequences?

Curtis: He’s clearly openly defied the U.S. position, as you said. But the U.S. is definitely in a quandary, and I think Musharraf knows this. He’s certainly very bold. We have seen that. The U.S. has taken a very strong line. I’m happy to see the U.S. Ambassador has made some interesting comments. She has said, basically, that the U.S. will proceed with its assistance program to the election commission and intends to deploy international observers starting on November 20th, planning for the January elections. So, basically, she’s proceeding as if the January elections will still happen. So, I think the message to Musharraf that U.S. Congressional officials are sending, that Bush is sending, Secretary Rice, is that we are reviewing aid policies and he has a limited window of opportunity to reverse course, reinstate the constitution, and get back to holding an election or I do think that the aid programs will be definitely under review. There may not be a wholesale cutting of assistance. And I’m not even certain that would be in the U.S.’s best interest considering that his security forces are engaged, losing their lives in the fight against al-Qaida. So, if there’s a way to support the Pakistan military without looking as if we’re supporting Musharraf the man, this is what’s important because we’ve lost a lot of credibility with the Pakistani population for what seems to them a Musharraf-centered policy.

Bennett: Musharraf really has, as you’re saying, the Bush Administration over a barrel on this, especially with the money. And where in the same breath you have our Secretary of Defense saying we’re going to review the aid program to the Pakistan military, by the end of the sentence, he’s saying, “But we can’t do anything that’s going to hurt the war on terror.”

Curtis: But I think the important thing to remember is Musharraf has put this situation in this predicament. He’s putting his own country in a predicament. He’s leading it down a path of instability. And, yes, the U.S. has a quandary now. And I do admit the U.S. was slow in understanding the ferment for democracy and the fact that Pakistan is not a Lebanon. It’s not Palestinian territories. The religious parties have never received more than five to seven percent of the popular vote, except for in 2002. But that was largely because of Musharraf’s manipulations of the election system in favor of the religious parties over the secular democratic parties.

Host: Let me ask Irfan Husain, what you make of the quandary that the U.S. is in now with regard to Pakistan?

Husain: I think one of the biggest drawbacks in this whole situation for the United States is that most people in Pakistan are convinced that Musharraf is acting with President Bush’s blessings. And this present coup that Musharraf has staged -- they think it’s with tacit American support and the statements that are appearing in the press are just window dressing. So, there are a lot of people out here who feel that the Americans are complicit in this decision. So, as it was, the Americans were very unpopular with the conservative elements in Pakistan. And now, civil society, the secular elements feel that America is a partner with Musharraf in this -- in this oppression. And I think this needs to be corrected. And it’s going to be corrected by some actual show of strength, if you like, where American policy is concerned towards Pakistan. Currently it’s seen as Musharraf-centric instead of being directed towards Pakistan as a whole and addressing different elements of society here. And most of the American aid, about ten billion dollars so far after 9/11, has gone straight to the military. And nobody knows what’s happened to that money. It certainly hasn’t been spent on poverty alleviation that anybody can see. So, unless something is done to correct this, I think Americans will become even more unpopular in Pakistan and with one element of society that so far looked up to America to lead this fight against extremism and terrorism. But now they’re seen as partners with Musharraf, and this is a very unfortunate development, I think.

Host: Brian Bennett, what room is there for the U.S. at this point to do something to demonstrate that it is not complicit in Musharraf’s martial law?

Bennett: I think, probably, a lot of it comes down to the aid money that the U.S. is pumping in -- about one hundred and fifty million dollars a month. And when you look at it, about sixty percent are direct reimbursements for the Pakistani military for actions they say they’re doing in the war on terror. And then there are other slices of that that are supposed to be going towards education and health care in Pakistan to alleviate some of the poverty that’s there. And I think it’s possible -- both the Pentagon and the State Department have said they’re going to review that aid money. I think it’s possible they’ll come up with some slight changes in the way that aid is delivered, but I really don’t see them being able to make a dramatic change in the amount of money that they’re putting into Pakistan and particularly in that we really know so little about how Musharraf’s government is spending that money.

Host: Lisa Curtis, Musharraf said in his speech when he announced the new emergency powers, he made a point of speaking not only to people in Pakistan but also speaking to the West and saying, “You cannot expect or demand from us the level of democracy you have earned over centuries of struggle.” Later in the week, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said, “It’s dangerous to stand up to a military dictatorship but more dangerous not to. The moment has come for the Western democracies to show us, in their actions and not just in their rhetoric, which side they’re on.” Which of these competing urgings is going to have more resonance in the West?

Curtis: Well, I think Benazir Bhutto’s statement makes a lot more sense. I think Musharraf’s statement underestimates U.S. understanding of the situation in Pakistan. I think there is an understanding that there is a democracy movement, that his credibility had slipped over the last several months. And so, I think the U.S. realizes that. So I don’t really take that statement of Musharraf’s very seriously. But what I would say, when we were talking about -- Clearly the U.S. is disappointed. They did not support this. There’s no tacit support. Secretary Rice could not have been clearer. She said it Friday, the day before he declared emergency, he should not do it. He defied her. He did it. So, I think the U.S. position is very clear on this. But what is not clear is, as Brian was saying, what can be done with the aid program. You know, there is equipment that’s being supplied. There are resources that are needed to fight these al-Qaida elements, which the Pakistani security forces are doing. And I think the U.S. would have to think long and hard before cutting that kind of assistance and think about the implications for what that would mean for a potential new terrorist attack against the U.S. or for stabilizing Afghanistan. So, I think that part of our assistance probably will be off limits and will continue. Now, what we can look at are other parts of the assistance. I don’t think we want to look at that part of the assistance that is going directly to the health or education sector. But there is a part of the economic support funds, a very large portion, that is provided in the form of direct budgetary support. It’s direct cash handed over to the Pakistan government. So, this is the kind of thing that we need to look [at] really specifically: are there ways that we can tailor the aid program that won’t impact the broader Pakistani population but will send a clear signal that we don’t support what Musharraf is doing?

Host: Let’s talk, Irfan Husain, about this aid question, specifically about the aid to the military in Pakistan. Mr. Musharraf is always justifying that in terms of the action taken against al-Qaida, particularly in the border regions. What sort of success has Pakistan had against al-Qaida in the border regions, and has it been as vigorous there as would be justified by all the aid that’s come in?

Husain: I’d like to say two things here. One is that this is our war, too, and we should not be doing this for the sake of any aid for Pakistan. Having said that, I think the war isn’t going too well because what you see now is the takeover of Swat Valley, which is not part of the tribal areas at all. It’s long been a settled area. And it was a big tourist attraction. What’s been happening over the last two years that one particular mullah has been building up a force of militants. And now I believe there are foreign militants coming in there, too. And they have taken over three towns. Thousands of refugees have fled from the valley. And this is, as I said, not part of the tribal areas at all. So, if they are coming down from the borders into settled areas of Pakistan, this is clearly a very dangerous thing to be happening. So, as I said, I don’t think the war against the terrorists is going well at all. And I think Musharraf needs to focus on that and to increase training to the army for counterinsurgency because so far, this has been a very neglected area. They’re using conventional forces against greater forces. So, these things need to be -- And that’s the problem with having a President who’s also Chief of Army Staff. He takes the eye off the ball. And things start sliding, as they have been for the last eight years.

Host: Brian Bennett, people in Washington who have been around for a long time, a number of them have said, “You have to be careful about how quickly you cut off some military dictator that has been an ally of yours” and have cited the example of Iran under the Shah and that whatever the deficits of the Shah, that it has not been good for U.S. policy what has happened in Iran in the aftermath of sort of walking away from the Shah. What can the U.S. do that isn’t going to create in Pakistan something akin to what has happened in Iran?

Bennett: I think you’re speaking to exactly what a lot of senior administration officials are basing their decisions on right now. We have our own inconsistent history with Pakistan itself. We’ve been their ally. We left them out in the cold. We’re their ally again after September 11th. And that insecurity among senior Pakistani officials, I think, is something we’re dealing with right now as to whether or not the U.S. is going to be Pakistan’s friend tomorrow. And I think probably a lot of senior administration officials are thinking, “Look, we need to take a measured approach to this. We can’t just react immediately to what Musharraf has done here. And we need to try to bring and make sure there’s some consistency to our policy so we don’t make a rash decision that we’re going to regret years down the line.”

Host: I’m afraid that’s going to have to be the last word for today. We’re out of time. But I’d like to thank my guests -- Brian Bennett of “Time” magazine; Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation; and joining us by phone from Karachi, Pakistan -- Irfan Husain of “The Dawn” and “The Daily Times” newspapers. Before we go, I’d like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our website at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For “On the Line,” I’m Eric Felten.