Transcript

Host: This is “On The Line,” and I’m Eric Felten.

The U.S. is continuing efforts to pressure Iran over its nuclear program, calling for new United Nations sanctions. International support for a U.N. resolution has been based on the belief that Iran is pursuing not civilian nuclear power, but the ability to build nuclear weapons. But early this month, a new report by U.S. intelligence agencies determined that, quote, “In fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear-weapons program.” This National Intelligence Estimate also assessed that Iran has not restarted its clandestine drive for nuclear bombs.

Administration officials say that support for sanctions against Iran is strong, even with the findings of the Intelligence Estimate dominating the debate. “We’re not talking about whether or not there’s going to be a U.N. resolution,” said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. “We’re talking about what are the elements to a new Security Council resolution?”

President George W. Bush says Iran has still not come clean with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, about its nuclear program. And that causes, he says, “deep concern.”:

Bush: "We believe Iran had a secret military-weapons program. And Iran must explain to the world why they had a program. Iran has an obligation to explain to the IAEA why they hid this program from them. Iran is dangerous, and they’ll be even more dangerous if they learn how to enrich uranium."

Host: How is the National Intelligence Estimate affecting U.S. policy and diplomacy on Iran? I’ll ask my guests: Dan Ephron, Deputy Washington Bureau Chief for “Newsweek” magazine; director of the Intelligence Center at Trinity Washington University: James Robbins; and, joining us from London: Alireza Nourizadeh, director of the Center for Arab-Iranian Studies. Welcome. Thanks for joining us today.

Dan Ephron, the National Intelligence Estimate has all sorts of material in it, and just about every one of the items is couched in a particular kind of terminology, which, as it keeps saying over and over, “There’s a high degree of confidence in this judgment. There’s a moderate degree of confidence in this other judgment, and we think we know this, but there’s only a low degree of confidence in this judgment.” So, what’s your degree of confidence in the Intelligence Estimate as a whole and, in particular, these findings that have been so much in the news?

Ephron: Let me break it down. The way I understand it, a nuclear-weapons program has three components -- enriching uranium, converting that uranium into a bomb, and then delivering that bomb, and if I read this right, the NIE talks about one aspect of that program being halted in 2003 -- the part of converting that uranium into a bomb, something that we can hold and carry and watch. And I think the degree of confidence in that element is quite high. That’s the way I understand it. My conclusion from reading it is that part was suspended. That doesn’t mean that the entire nuclear program was suspended. It’s probably not even the most important element of that nuclear program. Iran is still enriching uranium. But it is significant in that just a couple of years ago, the intelligence agencies all thought that Iran was charging ahead with all three sides of that program.

Host: James Robbins, Gary Samore, who was a proliferation expert in the Clinton Presidential Administration and now is at the Council on Foreign Relations, said about the Intelligence Estimate that enriching uranium is, quote, “the hardest part of building a nuclear weapon, and Iran is still doing it.” And he said that the NIE had given a misleading impression by not focusing on the enrichment aspect. Is that an accurate representation?

Robbins: I think so. The NIE focuses on basically two aspects of this question -- the capability and the intent to create nuclear weapons. The big change in the NIE from 2005 was on the intent side, saying, “Well, in 2005, we believe they had a program. Now we believe they do not have a program.”

Host: Now, you say 2005 because in the Intelligence Estimate from just two years ago, it concluded that Iran was pushing forward with a nuclear-weapons program even though this Intelligence Estimate says that that effort was shut down in 2003.

Robbins: That they intended to do this, that their intention in doing the things that they’re doing was to create a nuclear weapon. Whereas now, in 2007, it is the belief that they do not intend to do that. Yet they’re still doing the same things, and on the capabilities side, if you compare the two NIEs, in 2005, they said by the middle of the next decade, 2010 to 2015, Iran will have this capability if they choose to. In the new NIE, it says exactly the same thing. By 2010 to 2015, if they choose to, they can have a nuclear weapon. It’s just that in the new NIE, the intelligence community doesn’t believe that they will choose to.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh, are you there in London?

Nourizadeh: Yes.

Host: What’s your sense of the Intelligence Estimate? Do the intelligence agencies have a correct read on what the intention of Iran is with regard to its nuclear development?

Nourizadeh: See, but when they first response to the report by Mr. Ahmadinejad and people around him, they were so happy, and they considered that they are winning the battle, and this is a great achievement they have, and he came and said “this is the greatest achievement we ever had in the past hundred years, even more important than the nationalization of oil company.” But then people [got] wiser. They are reading between the lines, and they are now telling him, “Stop it. Mr. Ahmadinejad, the Americans, they are giving us such a clever report. Just read between the lines.” They are, first of all -- This is for the first time a document which says Iran had a second program, a military one. That’s for the first time. The Americans always said it verbally. Now it is within a report, a valuable report, which has been published by sixteen intelligence agencies in the United States. Therefore, the Iranians [are] now worried. The majority of the leadership is very worried about the outcome of this report and what [are] the consequences and what President Bush has got in mind. For other Iranians, some of them are disappointed because for many, many Iranians, the regime intends to build a nuclear bomb. And so they thought the American [were] giving them a concession, but in the past week or so, commentators, journalists, others, they tried to explain to the Iranian people this is not a concession. The Americans are saying, on the contrary, they are saying that the Iranians have capability and any day they can resume their military program.

Host: Dan Ephron, this is part of the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, that says that in their judgment, in the judgment of the intelligence agencies, the reason Iran stopped its intent to develop nuclear weapons, even though some capabilities were still going on, was because of pressure being brought by the U.S. and internationally. How is that being played in Iran, and, also, what is that message for the diplomatic effort that the U.S. has been mounting?

Ephron: Yeah, first of all, I agree with my colleagues. I’m not sure I read a change in the intent of Iran in terms of the nuclear-weapons program. I’m not even sure I see that in the NIE. But I think you put your finger on perhaps the most important element in the document, in the intelligence document, which is that at a certain time in 2003, Iran was susceptible to political pressure, to international pressure, and if we look at that time frame, this was as we were about to embark on the war in Iraq. Our troops had been in Afghanistan on the other side, on the eastern side of Iran for a couple of years already. And I think the reason this is important is it suggests to us going forward that Iran can be persuaded, can be pressured to, if not curtail, at least suspend its nuclear program for some period of time. Pressure can work. I think that’s one important conclusion from this document.

Host: And yet, Jim Robbins, in the face of this pressure, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been very vocal about not wanting to abandon the enrichment of uranium. Why shut down secretly part of the program while still sort of boldly declaring that other key parts of the nuclear effort are going forward full-bore?

Robbins: This isn’t 2003. Back then, the United States had a full head of steam. We invaded Iraq and, with breath-taking rapidity, took down Saddam Hussein’s regime, a regime with which Iran fought a ten-year war and could not accomplish that. And other states, like Libya, a proliferating state, looked at this and said, “Okay, we’re dropping our WMD program, and we’ll share with you all the information that we have.” And now the United States is welcoming a deal between Libya and France for the peaceful development of nuclear power. Iran, perhaps they gave it up. Perhaps they didn’t. They’re still enriching uranium. They’re still acting as though they have a program which could be weaponized, nor have they been forthcoming with the IAEA or in any other way as Libya had. So I think it is still a question out there whether or not they intend to build nuclear weapons in the future for those very reasons, because they’re acting in a way of a country that intends to do something.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh, what’s your sense on the efficacy of pressure from the U.S. and the U.N. and sanctions? Is Iran willing to change its behavior if it believes that there’s a strong enough diplomatic coalition against it?

Nourizadeh: Before I respond to this question, I just want to add that in 2003, President Khatami was Iranian president, not Ahmadinejad. So Khatami was -- well, he was thinking about the consequences of refusing the requests by the European countries, and, also, the whole leadership in Iran, they were very worried about the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the moment, the pressure is working. But, well, it’s not that effective, because Iran has got money. They can buy whatever they want. Also, you know, it became very difficult for them to trade, but still, it’s possible for them, through Russian, China, other countries, to obtain what they want. I think if within, you know, two, three weeks’ time, if we hear that the reason of the resolution, which is going to target [the] Iranian national bank: Bank Melli, and also those forces, then I think the regime will feel the effect of the sanctions more and more.

Host: What’s your sense, Dan Ephron, how this Intelligence Estimate is playing out? Though it concludes that pressure works, it seems that the effect of the Intelligence Estimate, saying that there is no longer an active nuclear-weapons program, seems to be pulling the rug out from under those efforts to maintain pressure. So how is that going to play, out this effort to pursue new sanctions against Iran?

Ephron: I think that’s exactly right. I think even before this NIE came out, I think it was hard for the United States to get countries like China and Russia on board with the really stiff sanctions. I think European countries have come around in the last year or so. But it will certainly now be much harder and virtually impossible. I think in some ways, this intelligence document has taken off the table both the possibility of really pressuring Iran through diplomacy or through sanctions, but, also, its taken off the table, I think, for the most part, the military option for this administration. It’s very hard to see a president, President Bush, attacking Iran in the face of an estimate by its own intelligence agencies that says it’s not weaponizing. It’s not building a nuclear-weapons program.

Host: Jim Robbins, is that the intended effect of the NIE, to take those options off the table?

Robbins: If so, it certainly should not be, since the Director of National Intelligence is part of the executive branch and answers to the President, so it’s really not his position to make the policy of the United States government. That’s only for the President to do. So hopefully that wasn’t the intent of it, because that would be the Director overstepping his bounds, and I don’t think that was the intent, even if that’s the effect. I think that internationally the effect has been to create a lot of tension in the region. Based on reports in the media, the Israelis are very upset about this. And it could in fact create a backlash there, both among the Israelis, who may now have a greater propensity to look to military action, thinking that they’re on their own, and to other Arab states, which even earlier this year had declared that they would begin looking at the peaceful development of nuclear power in their own countries with the belief that probably they’ll need a nuclear capability in the future if Iran achieves that.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh, Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France, said recently that he was concerned that if Israel felt that diplomatic pressure was falling apart with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, that it may have to take some kind of unilateral action against that program, and Nicolas Sarkozy said the danger of war exists between Israel and Iran. What’s your sense on that?

Nourizadeh: I believe the danger exists. I mean, I can just look at what is going on in Iran. I look at the Revolutionary Guards, and now they have a united command. And I look at their war games and their maneuvers and their test of new missiles, everything telling you that they are expecting kind of military action against Iran. They [did] not, you know, just take off the option. They believe that at the end of today, if the Americans [don’t] attack Iran, the Israelis will. So they are preparing both ways, militarily, and just, on the other hand, they are trying to send these messages to the Arab world, to the Muslim world, that we are going to be attacked, so therefore, they are preparing their cells, their secret cells in other countries for demonstration, for attacking American interests if the day comes. So the Iranians [are] looking at war as a really serious option.

Host: Dan Ephron, what’s your sense of the view in Israel of what’s going on in Iran? They have very different conclusions about what Iran is up to with its nuclear program. Do they have different intelligence information that they’re getting, or is it a different analysis of that intelligence, or is it just that because Israel was facing perhaps an existential threat: were Iran to get a nuclear weapon, they have to just consider that evidence in a different way?

Ephron: I think those are very good questions that are difficult to answer. I think Israel is genuinely worried about Iran, about Iran getting a nuclear bomb. I think they have every reason to be worried, given the rhetoric of Ahmadinejad. I think that Israel has created the perception, has said outright, that it might have to do this alone if other countries, if the United States doesn’t take care of it. But it’s hard to say whether Israel has created that impression in order to goad the United States into action or whether Israel actually thinks it has the ability to do it. And I think what’s interesting is in the aftermath of this NIE, of this assessment -- you know, the Israelis have all along been further out ahead of the Americans on the intelligence and particularly on the timetable. The Israelis have said that this is much more burning an issue and has has to be dealt with quickly. If the Israelis have intelligence that we don’t have, you would think they would be putting it on the table now and saying, “We know something that you don’t.” We haven’t seen the Israelis come out with anything like that. And perhaps that tells us that whatever sources, whatever intelligence information and gathering that we have here in the United States is no less than what Israel has as well.

Host: Jim Robbins, what’s your sense on these dual issues of Israeli capability -- both their intelligence capability and then also their military capability, the issue that Dan raises of would Israel be able to take successful action were they to choose to do so?

Robbins: That’s a very good question. Of course, Israel can’t afford to take chances, being a very small country, could easily be overwhelmed by a nuclear strike. So they can’t let it get to that point. This was seen earlier this year when the Israelis took action against a reported Syrian nuclear-research facility. They wiped it out. The international community didn’t really make a peep. So I think Israel understands that if they can take action, no one is going to object to that, perhaps pro forma, but not really. Whether Israel could successfully undertake that in Iran is another question. The Iranian nuclear program reportedly is in hardened bunkers. It’s dispersed throughout the country. It’s a longer range than just getting to Syria, so Israel would have to somehow plus up its strike capability to get to that longer range. It would be very difficult for them, but I think that we can assume that they understand all this and that they’re planning to do that whether or not the United States cooperates.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh, we only have about a minute left. What’s your sense of where this debate over Iran’s nuclear program goes next?

Nourizadeh: Well, I believe there will be more sanctions, but that sanctions, whether they will be effective or not, well, we have just to wait and watch. But I think the Iranian regime, they have the intention to build a nuclear bomb. And I don’t believe they have stopped it. Maybe they transferred it to underground or somewhere else. But this report is not convincing me that they have already stopped or they really have stopped all of material related to this program.

Host: Dan Ephron, what’s your sense where the debate goes next?

Ephron: I agree that the intent is still there. I think that’s a problem certainly for Israel and for the United States as well and for other countries that worry about a country like Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. I don’t see any way to get effective sanctions in place against Iran. And in some ways, maybe 2008 is Iran’s year. It’s a year where they do well.

Host: Jim Robbins, a couple of seconds for the last word.

Robbins: I would agree that Iran is doing well right now. I think this will just muddle through. We’ll see what happens with U.N. sanctions, but it’s going to be very difficult to get momentum up on this issue.

Host: I’m afraid that’s going to have to be the last word. We’re out of time for today. But I’d like to thank my guests -- Dan Ephron, Deputy Washington Bureau Chief for “Newsweek” magazine; and director of the Intelligence Center at Trinity Washington University, James Robbins; and, joining us from London, Alireza Nourizadeh, director of the Center for Arab-Iranian Studies. Thanks so much. Before we go, I’d like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our website at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For “On The Line,” I’m Eric Felten.