Editor's note: this story was translated from the original VOA Mandarin article.
Russian defense-linked companies are beginning to embed production inside China, acquire Chinese intellectual property and use Chinese equipment to sustain manufacturing at home, according to Washington-based research organization Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS).
A newly published report from the group notes that this marks a shift from arms sales toward semiconductors, machine tools, designs, testing, and scientific research.
“What’s changing is the nature of that support,” C4ADS analyst Allen Maggard said. “It’s not just China sending dual-use technology to Russia. It’s Beijing tolerating Russian defense industry contractors setting up production inside China.”
The relationship is not new: many links predate the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and some expanded after 2014. But Maggard says upstream defense-industrial cooperation has accelerated since 2022.
Element, a sanctioned Russian microelectronics holding, reported that it had begun assembling chipsets in China and incorporated at least four Chinese subsidiaries in 2025. In April 2026, Element reportedly acquired power-electronics intellectual property from Shijiazhuang Tonhe Electronics. Ten days later, one of Element’s Chinese subsidiaries acquired a Chinese company from which Element had bought unspecified equipment.
On September 30, Russian news outlet CNews reported that an Element-controlled company had delivered more than 100 pieces of semiconductor-production equipment in Russia and opened a subsidiary in China to oversee logistics and quality control. Neither source establishes that Element is producing military-grade chips in China or that the equipment is going to military customers.
Russia gains now; China gains later
China supplied more than 90 percent of Russia’s imports of goods that Western governments classify as high-priority dual-use items in 2023, according to data cited by C4ADS.
The report says Moscow receives an immediate industrial lifeline while Beijing gains designs, testing capacity and scientific expertise.
“In terms of short-term gain, Russia is gaining a lot,” Maggard stated. He said Chinese equipment, and Western equipment routed through China, helps Russia sustain wartime production and could support rebuilding its military after the war.
Henry Ziemer, a fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Moscow’s need is becoming acute.
“Russia in particular simply cannot do without support from China in the military-technical domain as war and sanctions erode its industrial base," Ziemer said. He added that the partnership remains significant despite its limited institutional structure.
China’s potential benefit is longer-term. Its reliance on imported weapons fell 72 percent between 2016–2020 and 2021–2025, according to SIPRI data cited in the report. C4ADS says Beijing increasingly seeks the knowledge behind Russian weapons rather than just its finished systems.
Russian trade records analyzed by C4ADS show that the Rubin submarine-design bureau sent 12 shipments worth more than $80 million to Chinese recipients linked to military procurement and state-owned shipbuilding between 2015 and 2023. The descriptions appear to involve submarine concepts and testing documentation.
“When you look at the long-term trajectory of Chinese Russian military-technical cooperation, China is going to come out on top,” Maggard said.
Coming next
Maggard expects more Russian defense-linked production to move to China if the United States and its allies impose no additional costs. He said Russian companies could establish facilities, acquire stakes in Chinese firms and buy their intellectual property.
Lyle Goldstein, Asia Program director at Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities, expects collaboration in 2027 and beyond to encompass “drone warfare, drone defense, air and missile defense, electronic warfare, and undersea warfare.”
“Absent U.S. and European pressure, I expect China-Russia collaboration to increase going into 2027,” Ziemer said.
The relationship still has limits. China reportedly restricted Russian access to advanced Chinese chips and precision machinery when sales might expose Chinese companies to Western sanctions, while Russia has prosecuted scientists accused of sharing sensitive information with China.
C4ADS recommends coordinated sanctions and export controls, stronger enforcement, investment in Western innovation and separate diplomacy with Beijing and Moscow.
Ziemer said Washington and its allies “should seek to raise the costs of collaboration for China and Russia,” including through selective pressure on Chinese research links and exports.
Goldstein was more skeptical. “I do not think sanctions make much difference now,” he said, citing Russia’s existing sanctions burden and Chinese countermeasures.
Analyst Maggard said no single policy can force the two countries to stop cooperating. The more realistic goal, the report suggests, is to raise costs, slow sensitive transfers and exploit the partnership’s internal tensions.